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Essays on Business Relations and Corporate
Finance
I˙rem Demirci, Ph.D.
The University of Texas at Austin, 2013
Supervisor: Aydog˘an Altı
This dissertation studies the impact of business relations on firms’ financing
decisions. The goal is to understand the determinants of business relations and how
they interact with firms’ capital structure. In the first chapter, I present a model
which studies the role of customer risk in suppliers’ financing choice. The base
model predicts that when faced with a high-risk customer, suppliers with significant
continuation values prefer equity over debt. The extended model allows for analyzing
the supplier’s decision to concentrate on a single major customer or diversify into
multiple customers. The model shows that by decreasing the risk of premature
liquidation, diversification allows for the supplier to take advantage of the bargaining
benefits of debt.
vi
The second chapter empirically investigates the impact of customer risk on sup-
pliers’ capital structure. Consistent with the model presented in the first chapter,
both cross-sectional and time-series regression results show that customer risk has a
negative impact on suppliers’ debt financing. Customer risk is an important deter-
minant of suppliers’ method of financing as well. During the first two years of the
relationship, suppliers with high-risk customers are more likely to raise equity. Com-
paring the impact of customer risk on different supplier groups shows that firms that
operate in concentrated industries and younger firms are more sensitive to changes
in customer risk. In further analyses I find that the risk is transferred from cus-
tomers to suppliers: There is a lead-lag relationship between customer and supplier
credit rating changes. Also, suppliers experience an increase in volatility of their
stock returns after they start a new relationship with a risky customer. Results from
further analyses are suggestive of customer risk affecting capital structure through
its impact on supplier risk.
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1 A Simple Model of Customer Risk and
Supplier Financing
1.1 Introduction
In this essay, I study the impact of a major customer’s debt on the supplier’s
capital structure and production decisions. I present a base model, which shows
that when the supplier is dependent on a single customer, high customer debt is
associated with low supplier debt, assuming that the supplier’s continuation value
is sufficiently high. This result follows from the fact that when continuation value
is high, the cost of early liquidation dominates the bargaining benefits of debt, and
as a result equity becomes preferable. An extended version of the model allows
for simultaneously studying the supplier’s financing choice and its decision to work
with a single customer or multiple customers. There is a range of moderate values
of continuation in which the supplier prefers equity over debt when diversification
is not possible, but the supplier finds it optimal to issue debt when it is allowed
to diversify into multiple customers. In other words, diversification decreases the
risk of premature liquidation, and allows for the supplier to take advantage of the
bargaining benefits of debt.
Studies show that firms can change their capital structure strategically in order
to manage their relationships with competitors, customers and suppliers. A great
deal of theoretical analysis has sought to understand the bargaining benefits of debt
financing within the context of labor relations or suppliers of other critical inputs.
The general finding of the literature is that by decreasing the amount of funds
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available, debt financing leaves less payoff to workers in a bargaining framework.
Several studies have investigated the role of capital structure in firms’ relation-
ships with their major input suppliers. For instance, Bronars and Deere (1991)
show that by decreasing the amount of funds available for a potential union, higher
debt helps to protect shareholders’ wealth against unionized workers. Dasgupta
and Sengupta (1993) argue that high debt might distort the effort away from the
first-best level, and as a result, the optimal choice of debt balances the bargaining
advantage of debt against the cost of moral hazard. They show that debt financing
may then alleviate the effort problem by encouraging more investment. Similarly,
Matsa (2010) provides a model which delivers the result that increased debt helps
to shield liquidity from workers, especially when profitability is expected to be high.
Subramaniam (1996) examines the underinvestment problem that is observed when
a customer firm makes an investment upfront, and the supplier can expropriate
the profits by threatening to delay or stop production. Subramaniam demonstrates
that this underinvestment problem can be mitigated if the firm is allowed to issue
debt and retire equity subsequent to the investment decision. Hennessy and Livdan
(2009) show that debt increases the agency costs for firms relying upon (implicit)
relational contracts for the provision of incentives, and that the trade off between
bargaining benefits of debt and the resulting inefficiency determines the optimal
capital structure.
Customer-supplier relationships are different than firms’ relationships with their
workers. While workers can increase their bargaining power by increasing unioniza-
tion, suppliers of critical inputs and buyers of primary outputs can use their own
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capital structure in order to increase their bargaining power against the firm. For
capital structure to affect the division of economic rents between two firms, it is
essential that either the product is specific to the relationship and/or the amount
of output is large. In both cases, the relationship becomes critical, and the ter-
mination of it can be very costly for both parties. If firms are equally important
for each other, product specificity does not necessarily affect the relative bargaining
powers. This makes capital structure an important tool that firms can use in order
to increase their bargaining power against other firms that they are in relationship
with.
The model is similar to those in Bronars and Deere (1991), Matsa (2010) and
Subramaniam (1996) with two major differences. First, the model studies the rela-
tionship with a major customer rather than workers, and confirms that debt financ-
ing positively affects the supplier’s bargaining payoff. Second and related to this,
it emphasizes the importance of the customer’s capital structure on the financing
decision, and delivers the result that when customer debt is high, the optimal capital
structure is not necessarily high debt.
While a number of theoretical studies have examined the impact of capital struc-
ture on firms’ relationship with their major input suppliers, there is not much discus-
sion on how the capital structures of two firms might interact during the bargaining.
Besides the importance of major customers on suppliers’ capital structure decisions,
another motivation for studying the topic from the supplier’s perspective is the avail-
ability of data. In accordance with the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
(SFAS) no. 14 and 131, public firms are required by the SEC to report the sales to
3
and identity of any customer that comprises more than 10% of a firm’s consolidated
sales revenues. This requirement makes it possible to detect suppliers with major
customers, but not necessarily the customers who might be dependent on them.
Banerjee, Dasgupta and Kim (2008) investigate the impact of business relations on
dependent suppliers’ capital structure. They argue that dependent suppliers might
hold less debt in order to protect themselves against the loss of principal customers.
To my knowledge, this is the first model that formalizes the idea that the supplier’s
dependence and capital structure decisions are interrelated.
In the existing literature, the input suppliers are generally passive (Bronars and
Deere (1991), Matsa (2010)), or they decide on effort (Dasgupta and Sengupta
(1993)), investment (Subramaniam (1996)) or quality (Hennessy and Livdan (2009)).
The contribution of this model is that it studies the capital structure decision of
input suppliers given the firm’s own capital structure. It emphasizes the trade
off between the cost of financial distress and bargaining benefits of debt. More
importantly, it shows that this trade off significantly depends on the amount of
customer debt.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 describes the base model, and Sec-
tion 1.3 solves the base model. Then, Section 1.4 extends the base mode for multiple
customers. Section 1.5 discusses testable implications. Finally, 1.6 summarizes find-
ings and concludes.
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1.2 The Model
1.2.1 Framework
The base model consists of two periods and two players: a supplier and a cus-
tomer. The supplier produces one unit of intermediate good, and the customer uses
this good in order to produce the final good. At time 0, the customer and the sup-
plier decide whether the supplier will produce for the customer or not. At time 1, if
the customer and the supplier agree on the price, the customer purchases the inter-
mediate good from the supplier and sells it in the market. The amount of output is
normalized to one unit. There is uncertainty regarding the market price of the final
good, which will be resolved after the supplier produces the intermediate good but
before it is delivered to the customer. After the uncertainty is resolved, the customer
and the supplier bargain on the price at which the customer will buy the intermedi-
ate good from the supplier. Interest rates are assumed to be zero. The shareholders
of the customer and the supplier are risk neutral, and both firms maximize their
shareholders’ value. Finally, at time 2 the supplier receives its continuation value
unless it is liquidated. Figure 1.1 shows the timeline of the events.
1.2.2 The Supplier
The unit cost of the intermediate good to the supplier, which the supplier pays
at time 0, is denoted as I. The supplier does not have any internal resources so
that it either issues debt (due at time 1) or raises equity in order to finance I. The
supplier raises only the amount necessary to complete the production, and it can
not hold cash reserves. If the customer and the supplier agree on the price, they
5
equally share the surplus from the trade.1 If trade does not happen, the supplier
sells its output in the market at a price of L. I assume L < I such that the market
value of the intermediate good is less than its cost. Note that the more specific the
product is, the higher the wedge between I and L is. The expected value of the
supplier’s continuation is given by Y , that is measured at time 2.
1.2.3 The Customer
At time 0, the customer has debt in place with a face value of Dc due at time
1. The supplier takes this face value as given.2 At time 1, with probability θ,
demand for the customer’s final product is high, and price per unit is PH . With
probability 1 − θ, demand for the final product is low, and price per unit is PL
with PH > PL. After demand uncertainty is resolved, there are two options for
the customer: First, the customer can produce a less sophisticated product without
the need for the supplier’s output and sell it in the market at a price of P . If
the customer chooses this option, trade does not happen. Production without the
supplier’s input is costless, but it does not yield a high payoff such that PL > P .
For simplicity, assume that the customer’s outside option is zero (P = 0). Second,
the customer can invest C in order to convert the supplier’s intermediate good into
final product, and the trade happens. The customer does not have cash and has to
1In Section 1.5, I relax this assumption, and examine the impact of bargaining power on the
outcome.
2Throughout the model, I assume that the supplier takes customer debt as given, and that the
customer’s financing decision is independent of its relationship with the supplier. Although, it is a
restrictive assumption, it is not unrealistic given the nature of the dataset being used. As a result
of the data generating process, the customers in Customer Segment Data are large compared to
their suppliers (and an average firm in the Compustat universe). Cohen and Frazzini (2008) report
that the median customer is in the 98th percentile of CRSP firms whereas median supplier is in
48th percentile.
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raise financing if it decides to invest into the supplier’s product. For both states I
assume that trade generates a surplus
Pi > C + I + L for i ∈ {L,H} (1.1)
This assumption is important because it ensures that when there is no customer
debt, trade happens in all states regardless of how the supplier finances its produc-
tion. Also, it ensures that the project has positive NPV such that θPH+(1−θ)PL >
I + C.
1.3 The Base Model with Single Customer
1.3.1 The Base Case: Low Customer Debt
The aim of this model is to study the supplier’s choice of financing given different
levels of customer debt. For this purpose, it is useful to start with the low customer
debt where the face value of customer debt satisfies:
0 ≤ Dc ≤ PL − C − I (1.2)
Note that this case includes zero customer debt as well. The condition in (1.1)
ensures that trade generates surplus in both states of the world. At time 0, before
the state is realized, the supplier makes its financing decision. At time 1, after the
state is realized the supplier and the customer bargain on the payoffs. I assume
that the customer and the supplier equally share the surplus from the trade, and
they agree to trade as long as their payoffs from bargaining with trade is greater
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than the value of their outside options.3 Let Sij be the trade surplus where i ∈
{L,H} denotes low- and high-demand states, and j ∈ {E,D} denotes the supplier’s
financing choice. First, I solve the bargaining problem given the supplier’s choice
of financing, and then I find the method of financing that maximizes the expected
value of the supplier’s shareholders.
Suppose that in the first period, the supplier raises equity in the first period.
The customer and the supplier equally share the following surplus from the trade:
SEi = Pi − C −Dc − L (1.3)
provided that
SEi > 0, ∀i ∈ {L,H} (1.4)
The constraint in (1.4) ensures that trade yields payoffs above the value of their
outside options for the customer and the supplier. Note that with equity financing,
since there is no risk of liquidation, the supplier can sell the output in the market
at L if trade does not happen. Here, I do not allow for the customer to strategically
extract part of the supplier’s continuation value in the bargaining process. Since
my focus is on the impact of customer distress, I rule out the impact of customer
debt on the supplier’s continuation payoffs. For this, I assume that the continuation
value is the present value of expected future payoffs, and it cannot be pledged for
current debt. The supplier’s payoff from trade is given by:
SEi
2
+ L =
Pi − C −Dc + L
2
(1.5)
3Here, the underlying assumption is that if the customer or the supplier defaults, the other
party cannot bargain with the creditors of the firm.
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which satisfies
SEi = Pi − C −Dc − L > 0 (1.6)
Note that the inequality in (1.1) is sufficient for this constraint to be satisfied.
With equity financing, the value of the supplier’s shareholders is given by:
VE = θ
[
PH − C −Dc + L
2
]
+ (1− θ)
[
PL − C −Dc + L
2
]
+ Y − I (1.7)
Similarly, with debt financing, the surplus from trade is given by:
SDi = Pi − C −Dc −Ds (1.8)
provided that
SDi > 0, ∀i ∈ {L,H} (1.9)
With debt financing if trade does not happen, the supplier’s outside option is
zero, which follows from I > L. The transfer from the customer to the supplier
under debt financing is given by:
SDi
2
+Ds =
Pi − C −Dc +Ds
2
(1.10)
provided that
SDi = Pi − C −Dc −Ds > 0, ∀i ∈ {L,H} (1.11)
Trade happens in both states, and the face value of debt is equal to the cost
of production (Ds = I). Therefore, the condition in Eq. (1.11) coincides with the
assumption in (1.2). The value of the supplier’s shareholders under debt financing
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is given by:
VD = θ
[
PH − C −Dc − I
2
]
+ (1− θ)
[
PL − C −Dc − I
2
]
+ Y (1.12)
Proposition 1 Suppose that customer debt Dc satisfies 0 ≤ Dc ≤ PL−C− I, then
for any continuation value Y , the supplier prefers debt financing over equity.
This result supports the conclusions of previous studies that debt financing in-
creases the payoff from bargaining. By issuing debt, the supplier can incorporate
the face value of its debt into the bargaining outcome.
Corollary 1 ∂(VD−VE)
∂I
> 0 and ∂(VD−VE)
∂L
< 0.
As I increases, the bargaining benefit of debt increases, and the difference be-
tween the supplier’s value with debt and equity becomes larger. With equity financ-
ing, the initial investment of I is a sunk cost, and it is not included in the bargaining
payoffs. On the other hand, with debt financing, part of this cost is shared with the
customer as Ds is included in the bargaining payoffs. The reverse holds for L: The
difference between the value with debt and equity becomes smaller as L increases.
This follows from the fact that with debt financing, the supplier’s outside option is
zero, whereas with equity the supplier can sell the output at L. Note that C does
not affect the supplier’s financing choice.
1.3.2 Medium Customer Debt
The interesting case happens when trade generates a surplus but because of high
customer debt trade does not happen. If customer debt lies within the interval
10
PL − C − I < Dc < PL − C − L (1.13)
then with equity financing the customer and the supplier still trade in the low-
demand state, but not with debt financing. If customer debt is high such that
Dc ≥ PL − C − L, then in low-demand state trade does not happen regardless of
the method of financing, which will be analyzed in the next subsection.
Under equity financing, the transfers from customer to the supplier are given in
(1.5)
SEi
2
+ L =
Pi − C −Dc + L
2
Note that if (1.13) holds, then SEi > 0. With debt financing, the surplus from
trade is given by:
SDi = Pi − C −Dc −Ds (1.14)
provided that
SDi > 0, ∀i ∈ {L,H} (1.15)
If trade does not happen, the supplier’s outside option is zero. The transfer from
the customer to the supplier under debt financing is given by:
SDi
2
+Ds =
Pi − C −Dc +Ds
2
(1.16)
Given the condition in (1.13) holds, then (1.15) is only satisfied for the high-
demand state, and trade does not happen in the low-demand state. One can solve
for the face value of debt as Ds =
I−(1−θ)L
θ
. The value of the supplier’s equityholders
with equity and debt are given by the following:
11
VE = θ
[
PH − C + L−Dc
2
]
+ (1− θ)
[
PL − C + L−Dc
2
]
+ Y − I (1.17)
VD = θ
[
PH − C −Ds −Dc
2
]
+ θY (1.18)
Comparing the shareholders’ value with debt and equity financing shows that
there is a threshold value of continuation above which the supplier prefers equity
over debt.
Proposition 2 Suppose that customer debt satisfies PL−C−I < Dc < PL−C−L,
then for continuation values Y < (>) I−θL−(1−θ)(PL−C−Dc)
2(1−θ)
= YM , the supplier prefers
debt (equity) financing.
In the low-demand state debt decreases the bargaining payoffs, and trade does
not happen. On the other hand, with equity financing the customer does not share
the cost of production with the supplier but the supplier enjoys the continuation
value in both states. For high levels of customer debt, the supplier trades off the
bargaining advantage of debt with the cost of early liquidation. Thus, for high
continuation values, the supplier prefers equity over debt.
Corollary 2 ∂YM
∂I
> 0, ∂YM
∂L
< 0, and ∂YM
∂(1−θ)
< 0.
For higher values of I, the bargaining benefit of debt is higher, and the threshold
value of continuation above which equity is preferred over debt increases. The reverse
holds for L such that as L increases, the difference between the value with equity
and debt becomes smaller. Also, a higher probability of liquidation increases the
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likelihood of equity being preferred, which results from higher expected loss from
early liquidation.
Corollary 3 ∂YM
∂C
> 0, ∂YM
∂Dc
> 0 and ∂YM
∂PL
< 0.
While higher C or Dc increases the threshold, the high customer debt case be-
comes more likely when L,C or Dc is high. Finally, higher PL increases the payoff
under equity financing as well as the difference between the shareholders’ value with
equity and debt.
1.3.3 High Customer Debt
In the previous case, equity financing has an advantage over debt financing:
In the low-demand state trade happens only if the supplier chooses to finance its
production with equity. With debt financing, trade surplus is reduced by both the
supplier’s and the customer’s face value of debt. As a result, it becomes more likely
that the bargaining payoffs will not be enough to generate surplus for the customer’s
and the supplier’s shareholders, and trade does not happen in the low demand state.
In the high customer debt case, assume that the following assumption holds
Dc ≥ PL − C − L (1.19)
Customer debt is high such that trade never happens when the low-demand state
is realized. As before, under equity the optimal bargaining outcome yields the same
trade surplus given in (1.3)
SEi = Pi − C −Dc − L
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Similarly, with debt financing, the surplus is as follows:
SDi = Pi − C −Dc −Ds
Note that if trade does not happen, the supplier’s outside option is zero. With
high customer debt given in (1.19), trade does not happen in the low-demand state
regardless of the state of the world. Here, I implicitly assume that price in high-
demand state is large enough for trade surplus to be positive.4
The face value of debt satisfies Ds =
I−(1−θ)L
θ
, and the supplier’s expected payoff
under equity financing is given by:
VE = θ
[
PH − C + L−Dc
2
]
+ (1− θ)L+ Y − I (1.20)
Similarly, with debt financing
VD = θ
[
PH − C −Ds −Dc
2
]
+ θY (1.21)
Proposition 3 Suppose that customer debt satisfies Dc ≥ PL − C − L, then for
continuation values Y < (>) I−L
2(1−θ)
= YH , the supplier prefers debt (equity).
Comparing both payoffs under debt and equity shows that for high values of
continuation, the supplier prefers equity over debt. For low continuation values,
equity is less attractive because I is a sunk cost for the supplier. While trade never
happens in the low-demand state, the supplier can still collect the continuation value
if it chooses equity financing.
4PH > C +Dc +
I−(1−θ)L
θ
is the sufficient condition for this.
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Corollary 4 ∂YH
∂I
> 0, ∂YH
∂L
< 0, and ∂YH
∂(1−θ)
< 0.
As it is the case for the medium customer debt case, a higher I requires a higher
threshold value of continuation for equity to be preferred over debt. With debt
financing, liquidation value affects the supplier’s payoff only through the face value
of debt. A higher liquidation value is associated with a lower face value, which in
turn increases bargaining benefits of debt in the high-demand state. On the other
hand, a higher liquidation value increases the supplier’s bargaining payoff under
equity financing in both high- and low-demand states. If the supplier can easily sell
its product to another customer, the cost of no trade decreases, which increases the
value under equity financing in the low-demand state. Finally, a higher probability
of low-demand increases the risk of liquidation, which in turn decreases YH , and
makes equity financing more likely. Note that the difference between the value of
the supplier’s equityholders with debt and equity is independent of C,Dc and PL.
1.3.4 Comparing Medium and High Customer Debt Cases
Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 show that in both regions, a high continuation
value is associated with equity financing rather than debt. However, the threshold
values of continuation are different for those two regions.
Lemma 1 If Dc < PL − C − L holds, then YM < YH such that the threshold value
of continuation with medium customer debt is lower than that with high customer
debt.
The major advantage of equity financing comes from the fact that it never leads
to liquidation, which exists for both medium and high customer debt cases. With
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high levels of customer debt, in the low-demand state, trade does not happen re-
gardless of the method of financing. However, when Dc is not too high (i.e. in the
medium customer debt case) trade still happens in the low-demand state with eq-
uity financing. This makes equity even more preferable compared to debt, yielding
a positive payoff in the low-demand state. Because of this advantage, even for lower
values of continuation that satisfy YM < Y < YH , equity is preferred over debt when
customer debt is not high. In the context of a continuum of possible debt-to-equity
ratios, the supplier issues more equity given medium levels of customer debt com-
pared to high customer debt case. Table 1.1 provides a comparison of the supplier’s
payoffs for different cases.
1.4 Extension of The Base Model: Multiple Customers
The base model studies the financing decision of a supplier that takes demand as
given. In this section, I relax this assumption by allowing for the supplier to choose
between working with two identical customers or being dependent on a single major
customer.
When a customer approaches to a firm to become its preferred supplier, the
supplier has the option to concentrate on the customer or stay as one of many
firms that the customer works with if the terms of the contract are not attractive.
However, if the supplier makes investments specific to the relationship upfront that
are expected pay off in later years of the relationship, then it might not be easy for
the supplier to adjust its sales to the major customer. Furthermore, in such cases,
the customers might obtain concessions in the form of low price or trade credit with
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extended payment periods.5 Although, the supplier has the option to halt delivery
if the customer fails to make payment to the supplier, the supplier still has the risk
of not being able to replace the customer immediately.
The supplier’s decision to have a concentrated or diversified customer portfolio
requires a cost-benefit analysis. In general, the cost of concentration is the product
uniqueness and resulting loss in the specific investments upon the early termination
of the relationship. On the other hand, dependence might provide higher profits in
the form of higher prices or lower transaction costs. The benefit of diversification
is the reduced risk of financial distress, which results from the cross-pledging of
revenues.
In this extended version of the model, I simultaneously investigate the supplier’s
capital structure decision and concentration choice. As before, assume that the
supplier has the capacity to produce one unit of intermediate good. The supplier
can sell this output to one customer, called the “major customer”, or to two identical
“small customers”. Assume that each of these small customers is half of the size of
the major customer. The demand for the customers’ products are independent from
each other. For the cases with single and multiple customers to be comparable, I
also assume that the face value of each small customer’s debt is half of the major
customer’s debt.
Suppose that customer debt satisfy the condition Dc ≥ PL − C − L given in
high customer debt case. First, consider the trade with the major customer. The
value of the concentrated supplier’s shareholders under equity and debt financing
5See Cunat (2007), Petersen and Rajan (1997), Evans (1998) and Wilner (2000).
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are given in (1.20) and (1.21):
V cE = θ
[
PH − C + L−Dc
2
]
+ (1− θ)L+ Y − I
V cD = θ
[
PH − C −Ds −Dc
2
]
+ θY
where Ds =
I−(1−θ)L
θ
.
If the supplier chooses to trade with two customers, there are three states of the
world to consider for the supplier: With probability θ2, both customers have high
demand, with probability 2θ(1 − θ) only one of the customers has high demand,
and with probability (1 − θ)2 both customers have low demand. The benefit of
diversification results from the assumption that PH is high enough for the supplier
to pay its debt in the second state when the relationship with one of the customers
is terminated. Under equity financing, with diversification, surplus from trade with
one small customer is given by:
SEi =
Pi − C −Dc − L
2
provided that
SEi > 0, ∀i ∈ {L,H}
The transfer from the customer to the supplier under equity financing is given by
SEi
2
+
L
2
=
Pi − C −Dc + L
4
Note that with equity, the supplier’s bargaining with one customer is independent
from the other one. With probability θ2, the supplier trades with both customers;
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with probability 2θ(1 − θ) trade happens with only one of the customers and with
probability (1 − θ)2 trade does not happen with any customer. Substituting the
supplier’s share from trade surplus into its value function yields:
V dE = θ
2
[
PH − C −Dc + L
2
]
+ 2θ(1− θ)
[
PH − C −Dc + 3L
4
]
+ (1− θ)2L+ Y − I (1.22)
The supplier’s problem with equity is simpler than the one with debt financing
because there is no risk of liquidation. As a result, the outcome of the bargaining
with one customer is independent of the bargaining with the other customer. In
case of debt financing, the bargaining payoffs depend on weather the trade with the
other customer happens or not. Consider the first case where demands for both
customers’ products are high. Conjecturing that in equilibrium, the supplier trades
with the first small customer, the surplus from the trade with the second small
customer is given by:
SD2 =
PH − C −Dc − L
2
provided that
SD2 > 0 and
SD1
2
+ L > Ds (1.23)
In equilibrium, the transfers from each customer to the supplier are equal and given
by:
SD1
2
+
L
2
=
SD2
2
+
L
2
=
PH − C −Dc + L
4
(1.24)
Now consider the second case where demand for only one of the customer’s
product is high. Here the underlying assumption is that trade with one customer
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is enough to pay for the face value of debt. Therefore, there is no risk of liquida-
tion. Conjecturing that trade happens with the high-demand customer, the supplier
bargains with the low-demand one. The possible surplus from this trade is given
by:
SD1 =
PL − C −Dc − L
2
provided that
SD1 > 0 and
SD2
2
+
L
2
> 0 (1.25)
Note that if the customer has high debt (Dc ≥ PL − C − L), the first condition
in (1.25) cannot be satisfied, and trade does not happen. The second condition
ensures that the equilibrium payoff is enough for the supplier to pay the face value
of debt. Next, the supplier bargains with the high-demand customer conjecturing
that trade does not happen with the low-demand customer. Here, the bargaining
outcome determines whether the supplier will be liquidated or not. In this case, the
trade surplus can be written as:
SD2 =
PH − C −Dc + L
2
−Ds (1.26)
provided that
SD2 > 0 (1.27)
In equilibrium, the transfers from high-demand customer to the supplier is given by:
SD2
2
+Ds =
PH − C −Dc + L+ 2Ds
4
(1.28)
Finally, the supplier is liquidated in the state where demand is low for both
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customers. Given the equilibrium, one can solve for the face value of the supplier’s
debt:
Ds =
I − (1− θ)2L
θ(2− θ)
Here, I assume that PH is high enough to satisfy the conditions in (1.23) and (1.27),
which can be rewritten after substituting the face value of debt as:
PH − C −Dc + 3L
4
>
I − (1− θ)2L
θ(2− θ)
(1.29)
and
PH − C −Dc + L
2
>
I − (1− θ)2L
θ(2− θ)
(1.30)
Assuming that PH is high enough to satisfy the conditions in (1.29) and (1.30),
the expected value of the supplier’s shareholders is given by
V dD = θ
2
[
PH − C −Dc + L
2
−Ds
]
+ 2θ(1− θ)
[
PH − C −Dc − 2Ds + L
4
]
+ θ(2− θ)Y (1.31)
To simplify the notation, let
A =
PH − C −Dc
2
Substituting this back into shareholders’ value under different financing and diver-
sification pairs yields:
V dD = θA+ θ(2− θ)Y +
(
θ
2
+
(1− θ)2
2− θ
)
L−
I
2− θ
V cD = θA+ θY −
I − (1− θ)L
2
V cE = V
d
E = θA+
(
1−
θ
2
)
L+ Y − I
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The supplier compares the value of its shareholders under different financing and
diversification pairs. The optimal pair depends on the continuation value such that
V dD > V
c
D ⇒ Y >
I − L
2(2− θ)(1− θ)
= Y1 (1.32)
V cD > V
d
E = V
c
E ⇒ Y <
I − L
2(1− θ)
= Y2 (1.33)
V dD > V
d
E = V
c
E ⇒ Y <
I − L
(2− θ)(1− θ)
= Y3 (1.34)
Lemma 2 Given I > L, Y1 < Y2 < Y3 holds.
Proposition 4 Suppose Dc ≥ PL − C − L and PH is high enough to satisfy the
conditions in (1.29) and (1.30), then the supplier’s value under different financing
and dependence outcomes are ranked as follows:
1. If Y > Y3 > Y2 > Y1, then V
d
E = V
c
E > V
d
D > V
c
D
2. If Y3 > Y > Y2 > Y1, then V
d
D > V
d
E = V
c
E > V
c
D
3. If Y3 > Y2 > Y > Y1, then V
d
D > V
c
D > V
d
E = V
c
E
4. If Y3 > Y2 > Y1 > Y , then V
c
D > V
d
D > V
d
E = V
c
E
For the values of continuation that satisfy Y3 > Y > Y1, diversification with debt
is optimal. In this case, the supplier enjoys both the bargaining benefits of debt fi-
nancing and a higher expected continuation value (i.e. lower cost of liquidation).
When the continuation value is high such that Y > Y3, the expected cost of liq-
uidation overcomes the bargaining benefits of debt, and the supplier prefers equity
financing over debt. Figure 1.2 summarizes the optimal financing and diversification
pairs for possible continuation values.
22
Note that the threshold value of Y above which equity is preferred over debt in
Proposition 3 (YH) is equal to Y2. Without diversification, for debt to be preferred,
the continuation value should be below Y2. However, if the supplier is allowed to
diversify its production, this threshold is increased to Y3, and debt is still preferred
over equity for Y3 > Y > Y2. This extension shows that by decreasing the expected
cost of early liquidation, diversification allows the supplier to take advantage of the
bargaining benefits of debt for a wider range of continuation values.
Corollary 5 0 < ∂Y1
∂I
< ∂Y2
∂I
< ∂Y3
∂I
and 0 > ∂Y1
∂L
> ∂Y2
∂L
> ∂Y3
∂L
.
All three thresholds Y1, Y2 and Y3 increase with the supplier’s cost of production,
but the threshold, above which equity is preferred over debt (Y3) is the most sensitive
to changes in investment. A higher initial investment can make the supplier favor
debt over equity. Conversely, all threshold values decrease with liquidation value,
again with Y3 being the most sensitive threshold.
1.5 Testable Implications
Proposition 1 demonstrates that when customer debt is low, the supplier prefers
debt over equity, regardless of the value of continuation and the probability of low
demand. Low customer debt allows for the customer to invest into supplier’s prod-
uct and still have a positive payoff from trade. This ensures that trade happens
regardless of the future demand, and eliminates any risk of supplier being liqui-
dated early. With the cost of early liquidation being zero, the supplier increases its
payoffs with bargaining benefits of debt. On the other hand, high customer debt
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increases the probability of the relationship being terminated and the supplier being
liquidated. In this case low debt becomes optimal for the supplier.
Prediction 1 High customer leverage is associated with low supplier leverage.
Proposition 2 and 3 show that continuation value is an important parameter
that affects the supplier’s financing decision when customer debt is high. The model
predicts that if the supplier has future value that it cannot pledge for its current
debt, then the supplier cannot take the risk of early liquidation. In this case, equity
becomes more likely.
Prediction 2 Suppliers with significant future growth options are more likely to
hold less debt if their major customers are highly leveraged.
Proposition 2 and 3 demonstrate that in all three regions of customer debt, the
difference between the supplier’s value under debt and equity financing increases
with the amount of initial investment I and decreases with the liquidation value L.
Prediction 3 Given that the customer has high debt, suppliers are more likely to
prefer debt over equity if the relationship requires large upfront investments which
are expected to pay off in the future; and are more likely to prefer equity over debt
if the liquidation value of the product is high.
Note that one empirical proxy for the initial setup costs is the amount of sales
that the supplier makes to the customer. The larger the sales, the higher the spe-
cialization and investments required for the tailored production. R&D expenditures
and industry concentration can also measure the degree of product specialization.
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For financing to be an important decision, it is essential that the supplier’s
product cannot be deployed without any cost. Even with zero customer debt, the
bargaining benefit of debt financing is realized only if L < I. Otherwise, the share-
holders’ value under debt and equity are the same. However, given L < I and the
customer has high debt, the supplier’s payoff is affected by the liquidation value
more under equity rather than debt.
Suppose that the customer debt satisfies Dc ≥ PL − C − L, and the supplier’s
and the customer’s bargaining powers are given by the parameters α and 1− α.
Proposition 5 For continuation values Y < (>) (1−α)(I−L)
(1−θ)
= Y αH , the supplier
prefers debt (equity).
The threshold value of continuation above which equity is preferred over debt
increases with customer’s bargaining power. In other words, if the customer has
more bargaining power, the supplier adjusts its bargaining power using debt, which
makes equity less likely.
Corollary 6
∂Y α
H
∂(1−α)
> 0.
Prediction 4 If the customer has more bargaining power, the supplier is less likely
to prefer equity over debt.
There are couple of possible proxies for the customer’s bargaining power. For in-
stance, a high industry concentration can be associated with high bargaining power.
Also, if the supplier industry is competitive, the customer might be able to switch
to another supplier, which increases its bargaining power. On the other hand, if the
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customer’s purchases have been concentrated in a single supplier, the switching costs
for the customer might be high, which in turn decreases the customer’s bargaining
power.
Finally, Proposition 4 shows that diversification can decrease the risk of early
liquidation and helps the supplier to enjoy bargaining benefits of debt.
Prediction 5 If the supplier has the opportunity to work with multiple customers,
the supplier is more likely to issue debt and diversify its customer portfolio.
1.6 Discussion and Conclusion
I present a model which studies the role of customer risk in suppliers’ financing
choice. The base model predicts that when suppliers face with a high-risk customer,
they prefer equity over debt. The extended model analyzes the supplier’s choice
between concentrating on a single major customer or diversifying into multiple cus-
tomers. I show that by decreasing the risk of premature liquidation, diversification
allows for the supplier to take advantage of the bargaining benefits of debt.
In this simple model, the supplier takes customer debt as given, and the customer
does not consider its relationship with the supplier while deciding on its financing.
Although, suppliers might collectively have an impact on the customer’s decision,
it is unlikely that a large customer’s capital structure is affected by its relationship
with a single small supplier. Nevertheless, it is useful to discuss the possibility of
joint determination of customer and supplier debt.
If the customer and the supplier decide on their capital structures simultane-
ously, then the relative magnitudes of continuation values become an important
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determinant of each firm’s choice of financing. If both firms have negligible con-
tinuation values, then they both issue debt and liquidate in the low-demand state.
With differential continuation values, the firm with high continuation value issues
equity, and the one with low continuation value issues debt, which coincides with
the case given in Proposition 3.
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Figure 1.1: Timeline of The Events
This figure presents the timeline of the events of the model. The first period involves the supplier
producing one unit of output for the customer. At time 0, the supplier borrows an amount equal
to I or issues equity in order to finance this production. At time 1, the customer and the supplier
share the profits from the sale of the final good. The customer’s and supplier’s debt are due at time
1.
0 1 2
Cost of
production (I)
L (liquidation)
or Y (continuation)
Supplier
Production
decision
Bargaining
Debt due (Ds)
Production
completed
0 1 2
Customer
Investment
decision (C)
Debt due (Dc)
Price realized
{PH , PL}
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Figure 1.2: Diversification versus Concentration and The Choice of Financing
This figure presents the optimal financing and diversification pairs for different ranges of supplier’s
continuation value.
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Table 1.1: Summary of the Solution to the Base Model
This table summarized the supplier payoffs from bargaining for each state under different methods
of financing. Case 1, Case 2 and Case 3 coincide with Low, Medium and High Customer Debt cases,
respectively.
Supplier Payoff
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
State (T = 1) Financing (T = 0) 0 ≤ Dc ≤ PL − C − I PL − C − I < Dc < PL − C − L Dc ≥ PL − C − L
High-demand (θ) Debt PH−C−Dc−I
2
PH−C−Ds−Dc
2
PH−C−Ds−Dc
2
Equity PH−C−Dc+L
2
PH−C+L−Dc
2
PH−C+L−Dc
2
Low-demand (1− θ) Debt PL−C−Dc−I
2
No trade No trade
Equity PL−C−Dc+L
2
PL−C+L−Dc
2
No trade
Always Debt
I−θL−(1−θ)(PL−C−Dc)
2(1−θ)
= YM
I−L
2(1−θ)
= YH
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2 Does Customer Risk Affect Suppliers’ Capital
Structure Decisions?
2.1 Introduction and The Related Literature
2.1.1 Motivation
When a supplier is dependent on the business of a major customer, it carries
the risk of a sharp decline in sales if the customer experiences financial distress.
Furthermore, if financial distress results in customer bankruptcy, it can cause both
termination of long-term contracts between the customer and the supplier as well
as loss of relation-specific investments made by the supplier. While the impact
of customer financial distress and bankruptcy on supplier stock returns have been
documented, their implications for capital structure have not been investigated.
This study aims to fill this gap by analyzing how financial risk of major customers
can affect suppliers’ capital structure choices.
I hypothesize that suppliers use debt financing more conservatively when their
major customers are more likely to experience financial or economic problems. Using
leverage, volatility of stock returns and credit ratings as proxies for customer risk,
I show that there is a negative relationship between supplier leverage and customer
risk proxies, both in the cross section and in time series. This negative effect is
also prominent in the net debt issuance activity of suppliers, and it is not driven by
firms rebalancing their leverage ratios or decrease in suppliers’ demand for external
financing. Comparing the impact of customer risk on different supplier groups shows
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that firms that are young, and firms that operate in concentrated industries are
more sensitive to changes in customer risk. Suppliers with risky customers are more
likely to raise equity during the first two years of the relationship. The results
from further analyses suggest that customer risk affects suppliers’ capital structure
through its impact on supplier’s risk. Using changes in credit ratings, I find that
there is a lead-lag relationship between customer and supplier credit rating changes.
Also, suppliers experience an increase in volatility of their stock returns after they
start a new relationship with a risky customer. Overall, the results emphasize the
importance of major customers in firms’ capital structure decisions.
There are two important channels through which a customer in distress can affect
its supplier(s). First, the customer could postpone payments to the supplier for the
products that have already been delivered. For instance, during the recent economic
recession, many auto parts manufacturers experienced financial difficulties because
they could not receive payments from the Big Three automakers. The suppliers
group estimated that payments from the Big Three to auto parts manufacturers
decreased to $2.4 billion in March 2009, from a monthly average of $8.4 billion in
the fourth quarter of 2008.1 Second, the customer could terminate the relationship,
thus forcing the supplier to look for a new customer, and possibly lose investments
specific to the relationship. For example, after filing for bankruptcy in 2003, Kmart
terminated its 10-year supply agreement with Fleming Companies, whose purchases
1“The Auto Industry’s Other Crisis”, Businessweek, 13 March 2009.
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accounted for about 20% of Fleming’s 2002 revenues.2 Consistent with these pre-
dictions, Hertzel et al. (2008) find that firms’ financial distress has significant effect
on their suppliers’ stock returns during pre-filing period and on filing date. Inter-
estingly, they cannot find evidence for distressed suppliers affecting customer stock
returns, which they attribute to customers anticipating and/or causing the financial
distress of their suppliers.
Both the anecdotal and empirical evidence suggest that financial distress of major
customers can have significant negative impact on the operations and valuation of
their suppliers. In such times, having a conservative capital structure (i.e. low debt)
can help suppliers to avoid themselves from experiencing financial problems. For
instance, by having unused debt capacity (i.e. bank line of credit) or cash, suppliers
can minimize liquidity and debt-overhang problems when the financially distressed
customer delays the payment or fails to fulfill it. Also, because it does not involve
any interest payments, ex-ante equity financing can prevent the supplier from being
inefficiently liquidated in case of customer financial distress. I formalize some of
these ideas in a simple two-period model presented in the first chapter.
I begin my empirical analysis by testing the impact of customer risk on suppli-
ers’ capital structure. I use long-term credit ratings, industry-adjusted stock return
volatility, and industry-adjusted leverage in order to proxy for customer risk. I find
that, on average, supplier leverage is negatively associated with customer risk when
credit rating and stock return volatility are used as proxies. The pair-level fixed ef-
2“Kmart ends deal with food supplier Fleming”, USA Today, February 5 2003. Following this
termination, Fleming filed $1.5 billion in claims against Kmart for the warehouses that Fleming
built for Kmart services (“Big Grocery Supplier Files for Bankruptcy Protection”, The New York
Times, April 2 2003).
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fects and first-differences regression results suggest that this relationship continues
to hold in time series as well, particularly for customer credit rating and customer
leverage. Results show that deterioration in customer financial health is also asso-
ciated with lower net debt issuance. Analyzing the first years of business relations
is useful because during those years the supplier’s need for external financing is ex-
pected to be high, which allows for investigating the supplier’s choice between debt
and equity. I find that during the first two years of the relationship, suppliers with
high-risk customers are more likely to raise equity rather than debt. These results
collectively support my prediction that suppliers maintain low leverage when their
existing customers’ financial risk is high.
Customer distress might affect some suppliers differently. For instance, suppliers
that are financially constrained will find it more difficult to recover from the negative
impact of customer distress. Firms in concentrated industries are more subject to
strategic interactions that might weaken them in downturns. Also, firms that oper-
ate in concentrated industries are likely to have specialized products, which makes
switching to another customer more costly. Comparing the impact of customer risk
on different supplier groups shows that younger firms, and firms in concentrated in-
dustries are more sensitive to changes in customer risk. The cross-sectional variation
in changes in supplier leverage is consistent with the idea that suppliers respond to
changes in customer risk more when the cost of losing a major customer is high.
If customer financial risk has a direct impact on the supplier, then the supplier’s
credit ratings and/or volatility of stock returns should reflect the changes in cus-
tomer risk. Consistent with the risk transfer argument, I find that customer credit
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rating changes predict supplier credit rating changes, but not vice versa. While this
result holds using both annual and monthly data, the monthly results show that
supplier credit rating changes follow changes in customer ratings with one-month
lag. By focusing on a major customer, suppliers become exposed to uncertainties in
customers’ business. I use volatility of stock returns as a measure of uncertainties
surrounding the customer’s and the supplier’s business, and test whether starting a
new relationship with a high-volatility customer affects the supplier’s stock return
volatility. I specify a three-year event window around the year that a new customer
is added to the supplier’s portfolio. Results show that conditional on the customer
having high ex-ante stock return volatility, supplier stock return volatility increases
after the relationship starts.
The model presented in the first chapter predicts that by decreasing the risk of
early liquidation, diversification can increase the supplier’s capacity to hold more
debt. Consistent with this, the supplier might diversify its sales rather than de-
creasing its leverage as a response to an increase in customer risk. However, if there
are relation-specific investments involved, the supplier might not be able to decrease
sales to its major customer because of high switching costs. My results from survival
analysis show that the business relations are more likely to end after downgrades in
customer credit ratings. This result holds only for one-notch rating changes, which
suggests that termination is less likely after a significant deterioration in customer
financial health. Although, it is not possible to determine whether the customer
or the supplier initiates the termination, these results suggest that the supplier is
more likely either lose a major customer or to terminate its relationship with the
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customer after credit rating downgrades.
In order to test the robustness of the net debt issuance results, I conduct two
tests. First, I check whether the decrease in debt issuance activity is caused by high-
leverage suppliers who are likely not to issue debt in order to bring their capital
structure closer to the target. I could not find a significant difference in average
net debt issuance activity of suppliers with different leverage ratios. Second, in
order to rule out the possibility that suppliers issue less debt because of the reduced
demand, I use a financial deficit variable and capital expenditures to proxy for the
supplier’s demand for external financing. Results are not affected by these controls.
I also conduct some robustness tests regarding the first differences specification. The
reverse exercise shows that changes in supplier risk do not affect customer leverage.
The main results survive after controlling for customer industry-year fixed effects.
Also, controlling for various customer characteristics do not affect the results. These
tests help to address some of the endogeneity problems related to omitted variable
bias.
A major customer’s distress can significantly restrict the supplier’s financial flexi-
bility by generating liquidity shortages. In this case, major capital structure changes
that expand the supplier’s access to capital can alleviate the negative impact of cus-
tomer’s distress on the supplier. Accordingly, I investigate changes in customer
characteristics around supplier IPOs. I find that new customers added over the
four years following the supplier IPO have higher leverage, lower credit ratings and
higher stock return volatility compared to customers that exist prior to the IPO. The
results are not likely to be driven by the reversals in the performance of customer
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industries. This constitutes further evidence for the negative relationship between
customer risk attributes and supplier leverage.
I also investigate the impact of customer risk on suppliers’ performance. Using
sales growth and stock returns as performance measure, I find that during a down-
turn in the customer industry, suppliers that are dependent on their high-leverage
customers perform poorly compared to suppliers with low-leverage customers. Thus,
the data confirms the main premise of the paper, namely, that financial distress of
major customers has significant negative impact on their suppliers.
Since, operating risk is associated with high bankruptcy probability, firms with
volatile cash flows are expected to hold less debt in the presence of bankruptcy costs.
Parsons and Titman (2008) provide a comprehensive review of the empirical capital
structure literature. They conclude that the empirical findings for the impact of
cash flow volatility on target leverage is mixed. For instance, while Bradley et al.
(1984), Wald (1999), and Booth et al. (2001) document a negative relation between
cash flow volatility and leverage, other studies have found either the opposite (Toy
et al. (1974), Long and Malitz (1985)) or no significant relation between debt ratios
and cash flow volatility (Titman and Wessels, 1988). For the suppliers dependent
on their major customers, an important source of operating risk is the ability of the
customer to make payments, and continue with the business relation. This paper
contributes to the empirical capital structure literature by investigating the impact
of risks associated with suppliers’ revenues resulting from their major customers.
My results are consistent with the negative relationship between operating risk and
debt suggested by the capital structure literature.
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The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the
data and explains the empirical methodology. Section 2.3 reports the main results
from the tests of the impact of customer risk on supplier capital structure using cross
sectional, fixed effects and first differences regression models. Section 2.4 investigates
the link between customer risk and supplier capital structure, particularly the risk
transfers from customer to supplier. Section 2.5 provides the results from robustness
tests. Section 2.6 reports the results from further analysis, mainly changes in cus-
tomer risk profile around supplier IPOs, and supplier performance during customer
industry downturns. Section 2.7 summarizes the findings and concludes.
2.1.2 Literature Review
Financial distress is a costly event, and the possibility of financial distress affects
the operating performance of a firm through various stakeholder relations. Starting
with Titman (1984), a literature has evolved to investigate the conflicts between a
financially distressed firm and its stakeholders, and how those conflicts may affect
the firm’s capital structure decisions.3 The main message of this literature (i.e.
Titman (1984), Titman and Wessels (1988), Banerjee, Dasgupta and Kim (2008))
is that those firms whose liquidation can impose high costs on their customers and
other non-financial stakeholders choose to have lower leverage ratios compared to
others.
While it is believed that firms adjust their capital structure in order to avoid their
business relations being affected by their own financial distress risk; non-financial
3A broader stream of the financial distress literature focuses on the causes of financial distress
and how to measure the costs and benefits of it. Examples include Altman (1984), Opler and
Titman (1994), Andrade and Kaplan (1998).
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stakeholders’ responses to such risks have not received much attention. The current
paper aims to fill this gap by investigating the changes in suppliers’ capital structure
with customer risk. Under certain conditions (i.e. if the customer operates in a
concentrated industry) a supplier might be willing to (or might have to) work with
a risky customer, but depending on such customers can have negative consequences
(such as late payments, non-payments and/or loss of a major business relationship)
for the supplier in the event that the customer experiences distress. Given such
risks the supplier might find it optimal to decrease its own financial risk (i.e. by
decreasing its own leverage) in order to avoid problems that might result from its
relation with the risky customer.
Hertzel et al. (2008) investigates the wealth effects of distress and bankruptcy
filing for suppliers and customers of filing firms. By analyzing the stock returns of ri-
vals, suppliers, and customers, they find that firms’ financial distress have significant
effect on their rivals’ and suppliers’ stock returns during the period before the filing
and on filing date. However, when they investigate the financially distressed firms’
impact on their customers, they do not find any significant effect. They attribute
this to customers anticipating and/or causing the financial distress of a supplier.
Kolay, Lemmon and Tashjian (2012) conduct an empirical examination on a sam-
ple of 269 firms which went bankrupt between 1980 and 2009 and a corresponding
sample of their suppliers and customers. They find that suppliers which depend
on their filing customer to generate a larger portion of their sales, and which have
higher product specialization have a higher level of contagion. They estimate that a
10% lower chance of successful customer reorganization translates into $24.5 million
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extra loss of market capitalization for the suppliers.
The existing literature shows that the strength and dependence of business rela-
tions affect firms’ capital structure. Kale and Shahrur (2007) argue that a firm can
use less debt in its capital structure in order to induce its suppliers and customers
to undertake relation-specific investments. Using R&D investment as a proxy for
the amount of relation-specific investment, they show that customers and suppliers
use less leverage when they are in such a relationship. Banerjee, Dasgupta and Kim
(2008) argue that durable goods producing firms that purchase a higher portion
of their inputs from dependent suppliers maintain lower leverage ratios in order to
encourage their suppliers to commit more relation-specific investments. Using the
ratio of sales to major customers as a proxy for supplier dependence, they show that
firms in durable goods industries hold less leverage when they depend on a single
customer; and customers hold less leverage when they have suppliers dependent
on them. This paper complements the literature on customer-supplier relations by
examining whether the financial distress risks of their major customers affect the
capital structure decisions of suppliers.
While the nature of business relations and their impact on capital structure have
been investigated, little empirical evidence exists on how financial characteristics of
firms in business relations might affect each other’s capital structure decisions. One
exception is Chu and Wang (2011), who investigate leverage relationships of firms
along the supply chain, and find that suppliers’ leverage is positively related to their
customers’ leverage. They argue that firms use leverage as a bargaining tool against
other firms that they are in a business relationship with. Consistent with this, they
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find that the positive relationship is stronger when customer firms have more ex-
ante bargaining power. Different than Chu and Wang (2011), the current paper
focuses on financial distress channel rather than bargaining power theories. There
are two major reasons for why the results in this paper are different than those in
Chu and Wang (2011). First, the hypothesis that I present in this paper build on the
assumption that the supplier is dependent on the customer firm in its revenues. As
a result, I restrict my sample to firms with customers whose purchases constitute
a significant share of total sales and those have been in a relationship with the
same customer for a certain period of time, whereas Chu and Wang do not use the
information on sales or duration. Second, I focus on manufacturing suppliers because
the mechanism proposed in this study through which the supplier is affected by its
customers’ financial distress requires the supplier to have specialized production. In
general, asset specificity is low in services sector, which makes it more difficult to
detect a relationship between supplier capital structure and customer characteristics.
Brown, Fee and Thomas (2009) investigate the impact of leveraged buyouts
(LBOs) on the bargaining power of firms with their suppliers. They find that
leverage-increasing transactions result in significant negative supplier announcement
returns. They also show that the specific suppliers, who are the ones most suscep-
tible to bargaining pressures, experience decreases in their profit margins following
their customers’ LBOs. While one might expect suppliers to increase their own debt
in response to increases in their customers’ bargaining power, Banerjee et al. argue
that once the supplier becomes dependent on the customer, it is difficult to use debt
as a bargaining tool. Although, debt could increase the bargaining power in general,
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it can also affect the supplier negatively. For instance, if the customer experiences
debt overhang, it might not be able to raise the financing needed to expand, im-
prove or continue the line of business that it has with the supplier. This might
cause the supplier to experience liquidity problems until it finds a new customer. In
such cases, having cash holdings and unused debt capacity can help the supplier to
manage the downturn.
Titman and Wessels (1988) test the theoretical determinants of capital struc-
ture such as asset structure, non-debt tax shields, growth, uniqueness, industry
classification, size, earnings volatility and profitability. Besides these firm-specific
determinants of capital structure, empirical studies find that there are also out-
side factors such as industry average leverage (Welch (2004) and Frank and Goyal
(2007)) that affect capital structure. Leary and Roberts (2011) draw attention to
the role of peer firms in shaping a firm’s financial policy. They show that peer firms’
capital structure have a large and robust impact on a firm’s own capital structure
decision. This study complements the literature by introducing customer risk as
another outside factor that might affect a firm’s financing decisions.
2.2 Data and Empirical Methodology
2.2.1 Data and Sample Construction
In accordance with the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) no.
14 and 131, public firms are required by the SEC to report the sales to and identity of
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any customer that comprises more than 10% of a firm’s consolidated sales revenues.4
These disclosures are made as part of firms’ business segment information. Prior
to 1997, Regulation SFAS No. 14 governed segment disclosure. SFAS No. 131
issued by the FASB in June 1997, has been effective for fiscal years beginning after
December 15, 1997. As of 1998, firms are no longer required to report the identity
of their principal customers but they still need to report the sales to each of them,
and many firms continue disclosing the identity of their principal customers.
While the customer information is available in the Compustat industry segment
files, it is not in an immediately usable format. The database reports only the
name of the customer (not CUSIP or other identifiers), and sometimes it reports
only the abbreviated versions of the names. This requires either manual matching
of customer names with their identifiers or using matching algorithms. In order to
generate a list of potential matches, I use a computer algorithm.5 Then, I visually
inspect the matches to determine if the customer is correctly identified. While doing
this, I use the industry information and check whether the customer is a subsidiary
of another company.
In my analysis, I focus on manufacturing suppliers because the mechanism pro-
posed in this study through which the supplier is affected by its customer’s financial
distress requires the supplier to have relation-specific investments. Because of low
asset specificity, such costs might not be significant in services sector, which makes
4Under REG S-K (17 C.F.R. 229.101) (Item 101), “the name of any customer and its relation-
ship, if any, with the registrant or its subsidiaries shall be disclosed if sales to the customer by one
or more segments are made in an aggregate amount equal to 10 percent or more of the registrant’s
consolidated revenues and the loss of such customer would have a material adverse effect on the
registrant and its subsidiaries taken as a whole.”
5STATA’s record linking program “reclink” written by Michael Blasnik.
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it difficult to detect a relationship between supplier capital structure and customer
characteristics for non-manufacturing suppliers. Table A2 reports the 2-digit SIC
industry distribution of suppliers in the sample. The sample weight of industries
are similar to their weights in Compustat universe.
The Compustat Customer Segment database includes both public and private
customers. I drop all observations without any customer name, with customer names
including “CUSTOMERS” (i.e. 2 customers) and those that are related to U.S.
Government. Between 1976 and 2011, there are 65,475 manufacturing supplier firm
years in the Compustat Customer Segment data with a valid customer name. After
matching customer names with Compustat companies, I obtain 33,706 observations
with non-missing customer and supplier assets.
After 1997, firms are not required to reveal the identity of their major customers
but they are still required to report the amount of sales to each of them. This is
one drawback of the customer segment data, which does not exist for the period
before 1997, when firms are expected to report both the identity of their customers
and the amount of sales to them.6 Banerjee, Dasgupta and Kim (2008) focus on
the early years of the dataset, mainly from 1979 to 1997. One advantage of their
study is that they do not use customer characteristics when they are analyzing the
impact of sales to major customers on firms’ capital structure. The only customer-
specific information that they use is whether it is a government entity or a non-
6Ellis, Fee, and Thomas (2009) study the characteristics of firms that choose to report the
identity of their major customers, even when they are not required to do so. They find that firms
in less competitive product markets are significantly less likely to voluntarily reveal information
about customers. They argue that because of strategic interactions among rivals, proprietary costs
of information disclosure is higher for firms operating in such markets.
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government firm. Furthermore, by focusing on the period before 1997, they can
identify all sales to major customers correctly and substitute the years without any
sales to major customers with zero. This delivers a larger and more balanced data
set. Unfortunately, when the interest is the characteristics of major customers, the
sample is restricted to Compustat firms only, and the years without any major
customers reported cannot be used. In order to increase the sample size and obtain
data on longer business relations, I use supplier years before and after 1997. Note
that the sample after 1997 is composed of suppliers who voluntarily report the
identity of their major customers.
For customer risk to affect a supplier’s future viability and choice of financing,
it is necessary that either the customer’s purchases constitute a large fraction of the
supplier’s total sales and/or the supplier produces an output that is specific to the
customer. The Customer Segment data provides two dimensions that one can use in
order to assess the strength of identifiable relationships: the length of the relation-
ship and the amount of sales to the major customer. I use both of these measures in
order to determine the significant relationships and eliminate any errors that might
result from data or matching. There are suppliers who report major customers even
though their purchases constitute less than 10% of total sales. Following Banerjee,
Dasgupta and Kim (2008), I use 10% as the cutoff point, but in order to avoid any
endogeneity problems, I use historical mean of sales to a major customer rather
than current sales. Only for the first year of the relationship, I use contemporane-
ous sales. This screening helps to eliminate errors that might result from data or
matching, and allows for those customers whose purchases decrease below 10% in
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one year to be included in the data. After determining those pairs with significant
amount of trade, I restrict the sample to those with at least three consecutive years
of relationship, which leaves out the short-lived relationships. Finally, I require the
customer not to disappear for more than one year.
The initial sample of Compustat firms consists of all non-financial, non-public
and non-utility (excluding observations with SIC codes 6000-6999, 9000-9999 and
4900-4999) firm-year observations in the annual Compustat database between 1976
and 2011. I require that all firm-years have non-missing data for book assets while all
multivariate analysis implicitly requires non-missing data for the relevant variables.
Ratio variables are winsorized at the five percent level to lessen the effects of outliers.
In order to rule out the possible impact of changes in market values, I conduct my
analysis using book leverage ratios.7
Supplier Leverage is defined as book value of total debt (long-term debt plus
debt in current liabilities) divided by book value of total assets. Ln(Sales) is the
natural logarithm of total sales. Market-to-Book is defined as the ratio of market
value to the book value of assets. ROA is the operating income before depreciation
divided by total assets. Tangibility is PPE divided by total assets. R&D-to-Assets
is total R&D expenditures divided by total assets. This variable is replaced with
zero when R&D expenditures are not reported, and R&D Dummy takes zero for
those observations and one otherwise. Net Debt Issuance is the change in total debt
divided by lagged total assets. Net Equity Issuance is the change in book equity
minus the change in balance sheet retained earnings. These variables are formally
7Cohen and Frazzini (2008) show that customer stock returns predict future supplier returns.
In this case, low customer market leverage might predict low supplier market leverage.
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defined in Table A1.
I use three different variables to proxy for customer risk: credit rating, stock
return volatility and leverage. Customer Rating is the S&P long-term issuer credit
rating measured at the beginning of the supplier fiscal year. The credit rating
variable takes a value between 1 and 22, where 1 coincides with rating AAA and
22 coincides with rating D. This variable captures the capacity of the customer to
meet its financial commitments, and therefore downgrades are expected to proxy
for the deterioration in customers’ financial health. Volatility of Stock Returns is
defined as the standard deviation of monthly stock returns (adjusted for median
industry return) over the twelve months prior to the beginning of the supplier’s
fiscal year. This variable aims to capture the instability of the customer’s business
environment and the uncertainties surrounding it. Finally, I use Industry-Adjusted
Customer Book Leverage as the last proxy for customer risk. High leverage can
cause the customer to experience debt overhang problems, which might result in
reduced investment into the supplier’s line of business. Andrade and Kaplan (1998)
study a sample of highly leveraged transactions that subsequently become financially
distressed. They find that high leverage is the primary reason for financial distress,
whereas poor firm performance, industry performance and interest rate changes
have negligible impact. In order to alleviate the endogeneity concerns, I use lagged
customer leverage rather than current one. Note that industry adjustments are
conducted using 49 Fama-French industry definitions and results are robust to using
three-digit SIC industry classifications.
The final sample is composed of 14,878 supplier firm-year observations with non-
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missing leverage, sales, market-to-book, ROA, tangibility, and customer leverage
variables. There are 1,770 unique suppliers, 709 unique customers and 2,827 unique
customer-supplier pairs.
Table 2.1 reports the summary statistics for the customer and supplier firms as
well as for the relationship characteristics. In all cases, the sample is conditioned
on the availability of supplier sales, ROA, tangibility, market-to-book, as well as
customer and supplier leverage ratios. Panel A reports the summary statistics for
the suppliers. Median supplier firm in the sample is similar to the median firm in
Compustat universe in terms of size, market-to-book and ROA. Note that the num-
ber of suppliers with a credit rating is very small, and the median rating coincides
with “BB”.
Panel B provides summary statistics for the customer firms in the sample. One
striking difference between customer firms and supplier firms is that customer firms
are much larger than supplier firms, and they have higher leverage ratios. On
average, customer firms are more profitable compared to suppliers, and a higher
percent of their assets is tangible. The median credit rating is 6 which coincides
with a rating “A”.
Panel C provides summary statistics on selected attributes of business relations.
Sales Concentration is defined as sales to a major customer as a percentage of total
supplier sales, which has a sample average of 24% and a standard deviation of 15.9%.
The duration for the median relationship is 5 years.
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2.2.2 Empirical Methodology
The empirical analyses implicitly assume that the supplier takes customer risk
as given, and the customer does not consider its relationship with the supplier while
making its financing decisions. Although, it is a restrictive assumption, it is not
unrealistic given the nature of the dataset being used. As a result of the data
generating process, the customers in Customer Segment data are large compared to
their suppliers (and an average firm in the Compustat universe). Cohen and Frazzini
(2008) report that the median customer is in the 98th percentile of CRSP firms
whereas median supplier is in 48th percentile. Although, suppliers might collectively
have an impact on the customer’s decision, it is unlikely that a large customer’s
capital structure is affected by its relationship with a single small supplier. The
following equation summarizes the empirical model:
Leveragei,t = α + β1Zj,t−1 + β2Ln(Salesi,t−1) + β3MBi,t−1
+β4ROAi,t−1 + β5Tangibilityi,t−1 + β6R&Di,t−1 + νi,j + εi,t (2.1)
Customer risk proxy (Zj) can be one of the three variables that measure cus-
tomer risk: credit rating, stock return volatility or book leverage. Note that all
explanatory variables, including customer risk proxies are lagged relative to the de-
pendent variable. In testing the impact of customer risk on the supplier’s capital
structure, I use lagged customer characteristics rather than contemporaneous ones.
There are two reasons for this. First, since customer and supplier industries can be
simultaneously affected from the same shocks, it is likely that contemporaneous cus-
tomer characteristics will be correlated with the error term in the supplier’s leverage
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equation. Second, there can be cases where the differences in fiscal year endings of
the customer and supplier firms might worsen a possible reverse causality problem,
specifically when customer leverage is used as the proxy. To see this, assume that
the customer’s fiscal year ending is December and the supplier’s is June. When
contemporaneous variables are used, firms will have the same fiscal year but the
customer’s financial information will span six more months into the future. Shocks
to customer leverage that happen between July to December cannot affect supplier
leverage measured at the end of June unless the shocks are anticipated. In this case,
a significant relationship between supplier leverage and customer risk proxies might
be driven by the shocks to supplier leverage that simultaneously affect customer
leverage.8
I incorporate the traditional determinants of capital structure into the specifi-
cation that are frequently used by many capital structure studies (e.g., Rajan and
Zingales (1995), Baker and Wurgler (2002), Frank and Goyal (2003), and Lemmon
et al. (2008)); mainly log of sales, market-to-book, profitability, tangibility, and
R&D expenditures. Note that the estimates for the intercept and R&D Dummy are
all suppressed to save space throughout the tables.
In Eq. (2.1) the term νi,j denotes the customer and supplier pair fixed effects.
Note that using pair fixed effects has two benefits. First, fixed effects rule out unob-
served time-invariant customer and supplier firm characteristics such as managerial
risk aversion, governance structure or cash flow characteristics. Second, pair fixed
effects help to control for relationship characteristics that might be correlated with
8In 5,210 observations customer and the supplier firms have the same fiscal year end month.
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customer risk and supplier leverage, and might affect the main results when omitted.
For instance, suppose that high-quality customers prefer high-quality suppliers, and
suppliers signal their quality by holding less debt in their capital structure (Mak-
simovic and Titman (1991)). If high customer risk proxies for low quality, then
failing to control for quality might cause customer risk to be positively associated
with supplier leverage.
Another way of eliminating the unobserved time-invariant effects is to estimate
the model in Eq. (2.1) in first-differences:
∆Leveragei,t (or Net Debt Issuancei,t) = α + β1∆Zj,t−1
+β2∆Ln(Salesi,t−1) + β3∆MBi,t−1 + β4∆ROAi,t−1
+β5∆Tangibilityi,t−1 + β6∆R&Di,t−1 + εi,t (2.2)
This model tests whether the changes in the extent of customer risk can help to
explain the cross-sectional variation in changes in suppliers’ capital structure. In
this specification, I also use net debt issuance as the dependent variable. As opposed
to changes in leverage, net debt issuances are not affected by the changes in total
assets.
2.3 The Effect of Customer Risk on Financing Decisions
If customer risk is a concern for suppliers, this might be reflected in customer-
supplier pairs observed in the data. Accordingly, on average, suppliers with high
leverage might find it optimal to pair with less risky customers and possibly, risky
customers prefer to have business with low-leverage suppliers who are more likely to
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survive in an economic downturn. Customer risk can also affect suppliers’ capital
structure after the relationship starts. The supplier might prefer raising equity over
debt in order to finance the initial relation-specific investments or adjust its leverage
ratio over time as customer risk changes.
I will begin my analysis by investigating whether customer risk is related to sup-
plier leverage in the cross-section. Table 2.2 reports the cross-sectional estimation
results of the model in Eq. (2.1). The first three columns report the results with
standard errors clustered at the pair level and the last three columns at the customer
and supplier level. All regressions include year fixed effects.
On average, low customer credit rating and high stock return volatility are as-
sociated with low supplier leverage. In terms of economic magnitude, the impact of
customer risk is not negligible. For instance, one notch decrease in customer credit
rating is associated with 0.3% decrease in supplier leverage. The signs of the co-
efficient estimates for all the control variables are consistent with previous studies,
and results are robust to clustering at the customer and supplier level. This result
suggests that on average, suppliers with risky customers hold less leverage.
Note that the coefficient estimates for customer leverage are not statistically
significant, but they have the expected sign. In the cross section, there are two
other possible aspects of the relationship that leverage might proxy for. First, as
proposed by Bronars and Deere (1991), debt can be used as a bargaining tool against
stakeholders, which predicts a positive relationship between customer and supplier
debt levels. Second, debt might be correlated with the unobserved characteristics
(such as quality or price) that are related to the relationship.
52
The cross-sectional results show that on average, suppliers with risky customers
have less debt. In order to understand whether this relationship holds in time-series,
I illustrate the average net debt issuance and leverage of suppliers around customer
rating downgrades. Panels A and B of Figure 2.1 present the unconditional averages,
where the supplier’s fiscal year begin at time zero. The customer downgrades happen
between time -1 and time 0, the fiscal year prior to the year that net debt issuance
and leverage are measured in. Panel A shows that there is a sharp decline in net
debt issuance during the year and the year following the customer rating downgrades.
Within two years, average debt issuance activity falls from 3% to 0.1%. Note that
net debt issuance starts to recover at time 1.
Panel B illustrates the changes in supplier leverage around customer rating down-
grades. The impact of downgrades is less significant for supplier leverage. There
is a 1.17% decline in leverage from time -1 to time 1. Note that the impact of the
decrease in net debt issuance is not reflected on leverage until the year after the
downgrade. The average leverage for suppliers without customer rating downgrades
also decline from time -1 to time 0, but recover afterwards. This shows that it is im-
portant to control for the economic conditions that downgrades might be correlated
with.
The unconditional analyses suggest that customer rating changes affect the vari-
ation in supplier leverage and net debt issuance activity, with the impact being more
prominent for net debt issuances. One potential reason for this is the simultaneous
decline in total assets, which offsets the effect of reduced issuances. In order to
control for the changes in other firm characteristics that might affect suppliers’ cap-
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ital structure simultaneously with changes in customer risk, I estimate the model
in Eq. (2.1) by repeating the analysis in Table 2.2 using customer-supplier pair
fixed effects. All specifications include year fixed effects. Table 2.3 reports the fixed
effects estimation results, which show that there is a negative relationship between
customer risk and supplier leverage when customer credit rating is used a proxy.
Note that pair fixed effects do not change the economic magnitude of the coefficient
estimate for customer credit rating. When customer credit rating is one notch be-
low its relationship-average, supplier leverage is about 0.3% below its average. The
coefficient estimates for return volatility and customer leverage are negative but not
statistically significant.
The results for supplier leverage is consistent with the idea that suppliers use
debt conservatively when their major customers are less healthy. So far, I used
customer-supplier pair fixed effects in order to capture the variation in customer
financial distress risk within a business relation. The next table presents estimation
results for the first differences specification given in (2.2) to further investigate the
time-series relationship between customer risk and supplier leverage. While both
fixed effects and first-differences specifications remove the unobserved within-pair
effects, first-differences results are easier to interpret, and are not affected by the
relationship-averages of customer risk and supplier leverage.
Table 2.4 reports the results for the first-differences specification. On average,
positive changes in customer credit rating and customer leverage negatively affect
the changes in supplier leverage. For instance, one notch decrease in customer credit
rating is associated with 0.5% decrease in supplier book leverage. The coefficient
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estimates for customer stock return volatility are insignificant. Overall, the first
differences results support the findings in Table 2.3.
Until now, I have not differentiated between customer distress and deteriora-
tion in customer financial health. The distinction is important because in case of
customer distress, rather than decreasing leverage, the supplier might issue more
debt in order to compensate the volatility in revenues caused by the customer. One
way to understand the difference between the two is to use the magnitude of credit
rating downgrades. In Table 2.4, I separate customer downgrade events as 1 Notch
and More than 1 Notch. If suppliers decrease their leverage in order to avoid future
problems related to debt, then the effect should be more prominent with smaller
downgrades. There are 894 and 751 instances where customer credit ratings are
downgraded by one notch and more than one notch, respectively. The results sug-
gest that there is no significant difference between 1 notch and more than 1 notch
cases.
Figure 2.1 suggests that the impact of changes in customer risk is more significant
for net debt issuances. The next table investigates whether debt issuance activity
of suppliers change with customer risk after controlling for changes in traditional
determinants of capital structure. The results in Table 2.5 show that debt issuance
activity is significantly reduced during years that customer risk is relatively high.
Note that the coefficient estimates for all customer risk proxies are statistically
significant at either 1%, 5% or 10%. Also, the coefficient estimates in debt issuance
regressions are larger in magnitude compared to those in first-differences leverage
model. This suggests that the impact of changes in customer risk are reflected more
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timely in the debt issuance activity compared to leverage ratios. If total assets and
debt decrease simultaneously, then leverage ratios might fail to reflect the impact of
customer risk.
The first years of a relationship are important because the suppliers are likely to
make investments specific to the new relationship during those years. Accordingly,
one would expect the suppliers’ need for external financing to increases at the be-
ginning of the relationship. Therefore, the new relationship provides a useful event
around which the supplier’s financing choice can be analyzed.
Table 2.6 examines this choice during the first two years of the relationship
conditional on various customer risk characteristics. Net Debt (Equity) Issuance
Dummy takes one when the net amount of debt (equity) issued exceeds 5% of total
assets and zero otherwise. Debt vs. Equity Dummy takes one when the net amount of
debt issued exceeds 5% of total assets and zero when the net amount of equity issued
exceeds 5% of total assets. Results suggest that suppliers that start a relationship
with risky customers are more likely to issue equity compared to those with low-risk
customers. Comparing the debt-equity choice shows that among supplier that raise
external financing, those with risky customers are more likely to prefer equity over
debt. For instance, 1 notch decrease in customer credit rating is associated with
1% increase in the probability that the supplier will prefer equity over debt. This
result is consistent with the main implication of the model presented in Chapter
1: Suppliers are more likely to prefer equity over debt when faced with a risky
customer.
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2.4 The Link Between Customer Risk and Financial Policy
In this section, I further analyze the impact of customer risk in order to under-
stand the mechanism better. The first subsection investigates the cross-sectional
determinants of the relationship between customer risk and supplier leverage. The
second subsection analyzes the changes in supplier risk following customer credit
rating downgrades, and the third subsection compares supplier stock return volatil-
ity before and after the relationship starts. Finally, the last subsection discusses the
relationship between customer risk and supplier dependence.
2.4.1 Cross Sectional Determinants of Customer Risk-Supplier
Leverage Relation
While the previous section focuses on identifying the response of supplier leverage
to changes in customer risk, this section investigates the cross-sectional variation in
this response. The empirical analyses so far assume that customers do not consider
the impact of their business risk on their suppliers. For supplier capital structure
to be exogenous to customer risk, the supplier should not have any impact on the
customer’s decisions. As a result, I expect the negative impact of customer risk on
supplier leverage to be more prominent for suppliers that are young. Also, young
suppliers have less stable cash flows and are subject to asymmetric information,
which makes it more likely for them to experience difficulties in obtaining capital
during distress periods.
The second cross-sectional variation is related to the supplier’s industry concen-
tration, which can proxy for the uniqueness of the supplier’s product as well as the
amount of strategic interaction in the supplier industry (Opler and Titman (1994)).
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Suppliers in concentrated industries are more likely to produce specialized prod-
ucts. Also, in case of distress, supplier firms that operate in concentrated industries
are more subject to strategic interactions that might weaken them. As a result,
customer distress might affect suppliers in concentrated industries more negatively.
The concentration in the customer industry is also important for the supplier.
If the supplier loses its major customer who operates in a concentrated industry,
the supplier might not be able to replace the customer immediately. Therefore, I
expect suppliers to be more sensitive to changes in risk if the customer operates in
a concentrated industry.
In order to compare the impact of customer risk across different suppliers, I
estimate the first differences model separately for different supplier groups. I split
suppliers into subgroups based on (1) supplier age, (2) the Herfindahl index of
sales concentration in the supplier industry, and (3) the Herfindahl index of sales
concentration in the customer industry which is defined as the sum of squared market
shares of industry companies.
Table 2.7 reports the results for each subgroup using credit rating as the proxy
for customer risk. Changes in customer risk have the most significant impact on
younger suppliers and suppliers that are in the most concentrated industries. Also,
suppliers do not respond to changes in customer risk if the customer operates in a
competitive industry. These results collectively suggest that suppliers that are more
likely to be financially constrained and strategically weakened in case of customer
distress, are more sensitive to changes in customer credit ratings.
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2.4.2 Supplier Credit Ratings and Customer Credit Rating
Downgrades
When their major customer is in trouble, it is natural to expect suppliers’ credit
ratings to be affected. For instance, after Kmart’s credit rating was downgraded,
Moody’s said it might cut Fleming’s debt ratings because Kmart was the grocery
supplier’s most important customer.9
The results of the previous section suggest that supplier leverage responds nega-
tively to increases in customer risk. In the context of the trade-off theory of capital
structure, customer risk increases the expected costs of financial distress by making
failure more likely, and predicts a lower target leverage for the supplier. If this is
the case, then supplier credit rating should reflect this increased cost. In order to
test this, I use first differences specification, and regress lagged changes in customer
credit ratings on current changes in supplier credit ratings using both the annual
and monthly data. Note that the sample size is restricted to the availability of
supplier credit ratings.
Table 2.8 reports the regression results estimated using the annual data. The
changes in credit ratings are calculated as the difference between the rating at the
beginning of the supplier’s fiscal year and the rating one year prior to that. Standard
errors are clustered at the pair level but similar standard errors are obtained when
they are clustered at the customer and supplier level. All regressions include year
fixed effects. The results suggest that changes in customer credit ratings predict
changes in supplier credit ratings. For instance, the result in the second column
9Reuters, January 14 2002, Kmart Shares at 34-Year-Low.
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shows that 1 notch decrease in credit ratings decreases supplier rating by 0.09-0.1
notches. Note that the results are not significant when contemporaneous changes
in credit ratings are considered. When contemporaneous values are considered, it is
difficult to determine whether changes in supplier ratings are followed by changes in
customer ratings or vice versa. In the third column, I control for supplier and cus-
tomer median industry sales growth, market-to-book and ROA. Results are robust
to these controls.
In the fourth column of Table 2.8, I split customer downgrade events as 1 Notch
and More than 1 Notch. Results suggest that one notch decrease in customer credit
rating, which is more likely to be a sign of deterioration in financial health rather
than a sign of distress, does not have a significant impact on supplier credit ratings.
On the other hand, more than one notch decrease in customer credit rating predicts
a significant decrease of 0.27 notches in supplier credit rating. This result suggests
that to the extent that changes in credit ratings reflect the change in cost of debt
financing, it is more likely that cost of debt will increase in case of customer financial
distress rather than in cases where financial health deteriorates.
Columns five and six of Table 2.8 report the estimation results from the regres-
sion of customer rating changes on supplier rating changes, and show that changes
in supplier credit ratings do not have any impact on customer credit ratings. These
results constitute evidence for the risk transmission between suppliers and their ma-
jor customers. The reverse exercise shows that the direction of the risk transmission
is from customers to suppliers but not vice versa.
The annual data allows controlling for changes in accounting variables over time.
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However, it does not tell much about how quickly the customer credit rating changes
are reflected in supplier ratings. In order to understand this, in Table 2.9 I repeat
the same analysis using monthly S&P long-term credit rating data. All regressions
include month fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the pair level. As
in Table 2.8, there is no significant contemporaneous relationship between customer
and supplier credit rating changes. On the other hand, there is a positive relationship
between current supplier credit rating changes and changes in customer ratings
during the month before. One notch decrease in customer rating is associated with
a 0.02 notches change in supplier rating after month effects are controlled for. Note
that consistent with the results using annual data, changes in supplier credit ratings
do not predict changes in customer ratings.
2.4.3 Does Supplier Stock Return Volatility Change After the
Relationship Starts?
Business relations provide a useful set-up for investigating the impact of operat-
ing risk on suppliers’ capital structure. If the supplier is dependent on a particular
customer, a negative shock to the customer’s business might be transferred to sup-
pliers in the form of reduced operating revenues. Unless the increase in the risk of
assets is borne by the debtholders, this will generate an increase in the risk of equity.
To further investigate the risk channel, I specify a 36-month event window around
the year that a new customer is added to the supplier’s portfolio. In my analysis,
I follow Hackbarth and Morellec (2008), who investigate changes in acquirers’ sys-
tematic risk around mergers and acquisitions; and Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino
(2006), who investigate risk dynamics around SEOs. The test is designed as follows:
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The test period covers the 12 months before the year that the relationship starts
and the following 24 months, including the starting year. The supplier stock return
volatility over these 24 months is compared to the volatility within the 12 months
before the relationship. Each month, stock return volatility is calculated as the
standard deviation of daily abnormal returns which is the difference between CRSP
daily common stock returns and value-weighted market returns. Customer and sup-
plier stock return volatility are used as independent variables, and are calculated
over the year prior to the test period.
Table 2.10 reports the results. All standard errors are clustered at the pair
level. The first column reports the results for all suppliers. The negative coefficient
estimate of the interaction term for ex-ante supplier volatility is suggestive of mean
reversion: volatility decreases after the relationship starts for suppliers with high
ex-ante volatility. Consistent with credit rating results, the interaction term for
ex-ante customer volatility has a positive coefficient estimate. Suppliers that begin
a relationship with a high-volatility customer experience an increase in their stock
return volatility after controlling for the initial volatility of their own stock returns.
The next four columns in Table 2.10 report the results for different supplier sub-
samples. Coefficient estimates of the interaction term between After dummy and
Ex-ante customer volatility are positive for all subsamples. The coefficient estimates
are higher for small suppliers, and suppliers with customers in highly concentrated
industries, but the differences in coefficient estimates are not statistically signifi-
cant. These results together with the results on credit ratings support the idea that
customer risk affects supplier leverage by increasing the expected costs of financial
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distress.
2.4.4 Customer Risk and Supplier Dependence
Until now, I assume that the supplier can only respond to changes in customer
risk by decreasing its leverage. The simple model presented in the first chapter
investigates the simultaneous determination of supplier financing and dependence
given the level of customer risk. The model predicts that by working with multiple
customers, the supplier can decrease the risk of early liquidation and enjoy the
bargaining benefits of debt. As a result, the supplier might prefer issuing debt with
multiple customers rather than issuing equity and being dependent on a single major
customer.
Testing the impact of increased customer risk on the supplier’s decision to di-
versify is not trivial. A supplier’s sales concentration changes with its total sales,
with the customer’s demand for its product and with the amount of product that
it is willing to supply. It is difficult to argue that when customer risk increases,
the customer’s demand for the supplier’s product does not change, and the impact
of customer risk on sales concentration is driven only by the supplier’s decision to
reduce its sales to the customer. Similarly, it is difficult to find an event that affects
customer risk but does not affect the customer’s demand and the supplier’s total
sales.
Another problem with testing the impact of customer risk on supplier sales
concentration is that rather than decreasing sales, suppliers or customers might
terminate their relationship after a negative shock to the customer firm. If this
is the case, then the sample is biased, and the impact of customer risk on sales
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concentration will be underestimated.
In order to understand the impact of customer risk on the relationship better,
I analyze whether increases in customer risk affect the survival of the relationship.
Note that because of the screening process, customers might still be reported by the
suppliers, but sales are low such that the average sales concentration is below 10%. In
Table 2.11 reports the results from the estimation of Cox proportional hazard model.
The hazard of relationships being terminated after customer rating downgrades is
1.2 times that after no downgrades. Surprisingly, this result is particularly true
for 1 notch changes such that when customer rating is significantly downgraded,
it does not affect the probability of termination. I also investigate whether this
result varies across suppliers. I split the suppliers into three groups according to
their R&D expenditures and size at the beginning of the relationship. The effect
is more prominent for suppliers with low R&D expenditures, whose products are
less likely to be specialized. Also, the effect is stronger for small suppliers. These
results suggest that the deterioration in customer health affects the future of the
relationship. Furthermore, either distressed customers terminate their relationship
with small and low-R&D suppliers first, or small suppliers and suppliers with less
specialized products find it less costly to break up with their distressed customers.
2.5 Robustness Tests
2.5.1 Managerial Rebalancing of Leverage Ratios
One concern regarding the net debt issuance results is that they might be driven
by high-leverage suppliers who are less likely to issue debt if they aim to bring
their capital structure closer to the target. While this does not explain why they
64
decrease debt when their customers experience a credit rating downgrade, I check
for this possibility by comparing the changes in debt issuance activities for different
supplier leverage quartiles. Table 2.12 reports the results from the regression of
net debt issuance on customer rating downgrade dummy for different quartiles. On
average, there is a significant decrease (ranging between 1.1% to 2.4%) in the net
debt issuance activity after customer rating downgrades. However, the p-values
suggest that the coefficient estimates for quartiles 2,3 and 4 are not statistically
different from the coefficient estimate for quartile 1. Therefore, results are not likely
to be driven by reversals in high-leverage suppliers’ capital structure.
2.5.2 Decrease in Debt Financing or Decrease in Demand for
Financing?
The main results suggest that there is a negative relationship between supplier
net debt issuance and customer risk. However, this does not tell us whether the
decrease in leverage is associated with a change in manager’s choice of financing;
or the customer’s demand for the supplier’s product decreases, and as a result the
supplier’s demand for external financing is reduced. In order to differentiate between
the two, I repeat my analysis in Table 2.5 but this time controlling for the supplier’s
demand for external financing.
Following Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Frank and Goyal (2003), I define
Financial Deficit variable as the sum of dividend payments, investments and change
in working capital minus internal cashflows. The financing deficit variable is scaled
by lagged total assets as in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). Table 2.13 reports
debt issuance results after controlling for external financing demand. The coefficient
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estimates for various customer risk characteristics are similar to those in Table 2.5,
which shows that reduced demand for outside financing does not explain the decrease
in debt issuance activity following increases in customer risk. Similar results are
obtained when the financial deficit variable is replaced by capital expenditures.
Another way of testing whether customer risk is associated with decrease in
demand is to directly test the impact of customer risk on supplier’s investment.
Table 2.14 reports the estimation results for the supplier’s investment regression.
None of the customer risk proxies has a significant impact on supplier investment.
I also investigate whether customer risk is more prominent during recession
years.10 Only one third of customer downgradings happen during recessions. In
unreported results, I fail to find a significant differential impact of customer rating
changes during recession years on supplier leverage. These results suggest that the
decrease in net debt issuance activity is not likely to be driven by reduced demand
for external financing.
2.5.3 Does Supplier Risk Affect Customer Capital Structure?
By construction, the data being used in this study is composed of suppliers
who report their major customers. Thus, the customers are significantly larger
than their suppliers who report them. Given this important characteristic of the
data, if supplier risk characteristics are found to affect customer leverage, then the
relationship between customer risk and supplier leverage is likely to be driven by
an omitted variable, and might not be related to the business between firms. In
unreported results, I failed to find a significant relationship between supplier risk
10Recession years are from The National Bureau of Economic Research.
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characteristics and customer leverage, which suggests that risk characteristics are
not likely to be correlated with omitted variables that might simultaneously affect
risk and leverage.
2.5.4 Additional Controls
The first two columns of Table 2.15 report the first differences estimation results
after controlling for changes in various customer characteristics, mainly changes in
customer sales, customer return on assets and median leverage in the customer in-
dustry. Results are robust to these customer controls, which suggests that customer
risk variables do not affect supplier leverage through their correlation with other
customer characteristics.
Since, on average customer firms in the sample are very large compared to both
average Compustat firm and average supplier, it is possible that changes in their risk
measures proxy for the downturns in their industries. In order to test this, the third
and fourth columns of Table 2.15 estimate the first differences specification including
customer industry-year fixed effects. Although, the statistical significance of the
coefficient estimates decreases, the coefficients are still negative after controlling for
shocks to customer industry.
The last two columns of Table 2.15 present the results using percentage change
in total debt (change in total debt divided by lagged total debt) rather than change
in leverage ratio as the dependent variable. Results are similar to those obtained
using change in leverage ratio.
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2.6 Further Analyses
This section presents the results from two additional analyses. The first one stud-
ies the changes in customer risk characteristics around supplier IPOs. The second
one investigates whether customer financial distress affects supplier performance.
2.6.1 Changes in Customer Profile Around Supplier IPOs
The cross-sectional results in Table 2.2 show that on average, high customer risk
is associated with low supplier leverage. This suggests that the supplier’s capital
structure might determine how risky the major customer is. A major customer’s
distress can significantly restrict the supplier’s financial flexibility by generating
liquidity shortages, but major capital structure changes that expand the supplier’s
access to capital can alleviate this negative impact of customer distress.
In order to test whether customer risk profile changes with the relaxation of fi-
nancial constraints, I focus on a nine-year window around supplier IPOs, specifically
four years before and four years after. I exclude the IPO year and require that new
customers that are reported during the four-year period following the IPO are not
reported before the IPO. Also, if there is more than one year that the same customer
appears before or after the IPO, I only include the first year. All customer variables
are measured at the end of the year prior to the relationship. Note that the IPO
year is excluded from the sample. There is no restriction on the duration of the
relationships but the sales to the customer is required to be above 10% threshold.
Figure 2.2 shows the histogram of customer financial risk characteristics before
and after supplier IPOs. The right tail of the distribution of customer characteristics
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become thicker after supplier IPOs, especially for the distribution of credit ratings.
Table 2.16 compares average customer characteristics before and after the sup-
plier IPO. Average customer book leverage increases by 3.2% after the IPO. Average
customer credit rating increases by 1.2 notch and stock return volatility increases
by about 1.7%. The customers added after the IPO are less likely to have invest-
ment grade ratings. Note that there is no change in median industry leverage of
customer firms before and after the IPO, which suggests that results are not likely
to be driven by changes in industries that the customer has business with or the
waves in industry debt levels.
In this exercise, one concern is the changes in market conditions around the
supplier IPO. If the timing of the supplier IPO coincides with a period of high
demand in the customer industry, then the results in Table 2.16 could be explained
by reversals in the customer industry’s operating performance. In order to control
for this possibility, I use regression analysis where I control for past performance
of the customer industry. Table 2.17 shows the results from this regression. All
coefficient estimates for the After IPO dummy variable have the positive sign, and
they are statistically significant. This suggests that the results are not likely to be
driven by reversals in the industry performance of the customer firms.
2.6.2 Supplier Operating Performance Around Customer Financial
Distress
Opler and Titman (1994) argue that highly leveraged firms are likely to expe-
rience financial distress during industry downturns, and show that they perform
poorly compared to their industry peers during such times. For customer distress
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risk to be a concern for suppliers, the operating performance of suppliers should de-
teriorate when their customers are in financial distress. In order to test the impact
of high-leverage customers on supplier performance, I use a specification similar to
one in Opler and Titman (1994) given in Eq. (2.3).
Firm performance = α + β1 Log of sales + β2 Industry − adjusted profitability
+ β3 Industry − adjusted investment/assets
+ β5 Industry − adjusted asset sale rate + β6 Customer leverage
+ β7 Distressed customer industry dummy
+ β8 Distressed customer industry dummy X Customer leverage
(2.3)
Customer financial leverage ratio is measured two years prior to the base year
(year -2). Sales growth, operating income growth and stock returns are measured
over a two-year period centered around the base year (year -1 to year +1). Follow-
ing Opler and Titman (1994), I assume that the customer industry is in economic
distress if the median sales growth is negative and median stock return is less than
-30%. All performance measures are adjusted for the supplier industry average.
Table 2.18 reports the results for suppliers with customers whose purchases con-
stitute above and below median separately. In order to avoid any impact of customer
downturn on sales, the suppliers are divided into groups conditional on their sales
concentration two years prior to the base year. Customer leverage does not have
any significant impact on supplier performance for the low sales group. However,
customer financial distress has a negative impact on suppliers that are dependent on
these customers. Dependent suppliers with high leverage customers perform poorly
compared to those with low-leverage customers during customer industry downturns.
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Note that earnings growth regressions do not yield significant coefficient estimates
for the interaction of distressed customer industry and high customer leverage. Opler
and Titman (1994) also find insignificant results for operating income regressions.
They argue that large cross-sectional variation in changes in operating income or the
tendency of firms facing financial difficulties to take actions that temporarily boost
operating income might cause this inconclusive result. Overall, results show that
customer financial distress negatively affects supplier performance, and therefore it
is natural to expect suppliers to consider the risk of customers experiencing financial
difficulties when they are forming business relations.
2.7 Conclusion
This essay examines the impact of customer risk on the capital structure decisions
of supplier firms. Consistent with the model presented in the first chapter, the results
from cross-sectional and time-series tests show that customer risk has a negative
impact on suppliers’ debt financing reflected in both leverage ratios and net debt
issuance activity. These results are not driven by firms rebalancing their leverage
ratios or decreasing their demand for external financing. The impact of customer
risk is also reflected in suppliers’ financing choice: During the first two years of the
relationship, suppliers who raise external financing are more likely to prefer equity
over debt.
Comparing the impact of customer risk on different supplier groups shows that
firms that are young and that operate in concentrated industries are more sensitive
to changes in customer risk. If customer risk affects supplier’s capital structure
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through risk, then suppliers risk measures should capture the changes in customer
risk. Consistent with this, I find that the risk is transferred from customers to
suppliers: There is a lead-lag relationship between customer and supplier credit
rating changes. Also, suppliers experience an increase in volatility of their stock
returns after they start a new relationship with a risky customer. These results from
further analyses are suggestive of customer risk affecting capital structure through
its impact on supplier risk.
In further analyses, I investigate the changes in customer characteristics around
supplier IPOs. I find that new customers added over the four years following the sup-
plier IPO have higher leverage, lower credit ratings and higher stock return volatility
compared to customers that exist prior to the IPO. Finally, I show that during cus-
tomer industry downturns, dependent suppliers with high leverage customers per-
form poorly compared to those with low-leverage customers, which suggests that
supplier performance can be seriously affected by customer distress. Overall, the
results are consistent with the idea that customer risk is an important determinant
of firms’ financing decisions.
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Figure 2.1: Supplier Leverage and Net Debt Issuance Around Customer Downgrades
Panels A, and B show the effect of customer credit rating downgrade on suppliers’ net debt is-
suance and leverage ratio, respectively. The sample includes all customers whose credit ratings
are downgraded from time -1 to time 0. For comparison, the averages for the suppliers whose
customers’ credit ratings are not downgraded are also plotted.
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Figure 2.2: Customer Characteristics Before and After Supplier IPOs
Panels A, B and C compare the empirical distribution of customer risk characteristics four years
before and four years after supplier IPOs. The sample consists of suppliers who report at least
one new customer over the four years following their IPO with purchases greater than 10%. For
comparison, suppliers are required to have at least one customer over the four years before their
IPO. If there is more than one year that the same customer appears before or after the IPO, I
include only the first year. All customer variables are measured at the end of the year prior to the
relationship.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
The sample is selected from all manufacturing suppliers with at least one major Compustat customer
over the period 1976-2011. The final sample is restricted to customers whose average past purchases
constitute at least 10% of the supplier’s total sales, and the customer is reported by the supplier for
at least three consecutive years.
PANEL A Summary Statistics for Supplier Firms
Mean St. Dev. p25 Median p75 N
Leverage 0.229 0.208 0.039 0.196 0.352 14878
Ln(Sales) 4.810 2.017 3.433 4.725 6.137 14878
Market-to-Book 1.866 1.373 1.025 1.366 2.103 14878
ROA 0.071 0.187 0.033 0.118 0.175 14878
Tangibility 0.240 0.159 0.109 0.211 0.348 14878
R&D/Assets 0.068 0.100 0.000 0.026 0.096 14878
Credit Rating 11.092 3.519 9 12 14 2426
PANEL B Summary Statistics for Customer Firms
Mean St. Dev. p25 Median p75 N
Leverage 0.246 0.157 0.121 0.232 0.335 14878
Ln(Sales) 9.770 1.886 8.775 10.066 11.099 14866
Market-to-Book 1.468 1.209 0.663 1.030 1.781 14353
ROA 0.142 0.076 0.092 0.143 0.183 14772
Tangibility 0.302 0.181 0.153 0.278 0.423 14878
Credit Rating 6.336 3.436 3 6 9 10533
SD(Stock Return) 0.080 0.046 0.052 0.068 0.094 13255
PANEL C Relationship Characteristics
Mean St. Dev. p25 Median p75 N
Sales Concentration 0.240 0.159 0.137 0.180 0.283 14878
Duration 6.209 4.011 4 5 7 2827
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Table 2.2: Leverage Regressions (Pooled OLS)
The sample is selected from all manufacturing suppliers with at least one major Compustat customer
over the period 1976-2011. The final sample is restricted to customers whose average past purchases
constitute at least 10% of the supplier’s total sales, and the customer is reported by the supplier for
at least three consecutive years. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
The first three columns report results with standard errors clustered at the pair level and the last
three at the customer and supplier level. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are
denoted by “*”, “**” and “***”, respectively.
Credit Return Ind. Adj. Credit Return Ind. Adj.
Rating Volatility Book Lev Rating Volatility Book Lev
Customer Risk Proxyt−1 -0.003** -0.142** -0.009 -0.003* -0.142* -0.009
(-2.243) (-2.446) (-0.431) (-1.773) (-1.958) (-0.323)
Ln(Salet−1) 0.025*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.019*** 0.020***
(10.732) (9.543) (10.309) (7.627) (5.955) (6.215)
Market-to-Bookt−1 -0.007*** -0.004* -0.008*** -0.007** -0.004 -0.008***
(-2.611) (-1.778) (-3.713) (-2.036) (-1.414) (-2.829)
ROAt−1 -0.338*** -0.341*** -0.331*** -0.338*** -0.341*** -0.331***
(-13.202) (-14.517) (-15.122) (-10.668) (-12.100) (-12.262)
Tangibilityt−1 0.241*** 0.241*** 0.243*** 0.241*** 0.241*** 0.243***
(8.816) (9.942) (10.448) (5.755) (6.472) (6.621)
R&D-to-Assett−1 -0.352*** -0.325*** -0.323*** -0.352*** -0.325*** -0.323***
(-6.995) (-6.611) (-7.453) (-3.968) (-3.952) (-4.284)
Observations 10,548 13,683 14,871 10,548 13,683 14,871
R-squared 0.173 0.147 0.156 0.173 0.147 0.156
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
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Table 2.3: Leverage Regressions (Fixed Effects)
The sample is selected from all manufacturing suppliers with at least one major Compustat customer
over the period 1976-2011. The final sample is restricted to customers whose average past purchases
constitute at least 10% of the supplier’s total sales, and the customer is reported by the supplier for
at least three consecutive years. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
The first three columns report results with standard errors clustered at the pair level and the last
three at the customer and supplier level. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are
denoted by “*”, “**” and “***”, respectively.
Credit Return Ind. Adj. Credit Return Ind. Adj.
Rating Volatility Book Lev Rating Volatility Book Lev
Customer Risk Proxyt−1 -0.003** -0.033 -0.023 -0.003** -0.033 -0.023
(-2.113) (-0.907) (-1.216) (-2.411) (-0.819) (-1.362)
Ln(Salet−1) 0.029*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.031*** 0.030***
(4.561) (5.416) (5.785) (4.069) (5.130) (5.397)
Market-to-Bookt−1 -0.010*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.007*** -0.008***
(-4.138) (-3.254) (-4.132) (-3.843) (-2.923) (-3.673)
ROAt−1 -0.185*** -0.197*** -0.202*** -0.185*** -0.197*** -0.202***
(-7.542) (-9.078) (-9.995) (-6.275) (-7.402) (-8.024)
Tangibilityt−1 0.165*** 0.161*** 0.169*** 0.165*** 0.161*** 0.169***
(4.231) (5.076) (5.595) (3.542) (4.588) (5.055)
R&D-to-Assett−1 -0.121*** -0.111** -0.120*** -0.121** -0.111** -0.120***
(-2.637) (-2.454) (-3.100) (-2.474) (-2.198) (-2.717)
Observations 10,548 13,683 14,871 10,360 13,489 14,636
R-squared 0.072 0.071 0.078 0.072 0.071 0.078
Pair FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
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Table 2.4: Leverage Regressions (First Differences)
The sample is selected from all manufacturing suppliers with at least one major Compustat customer
over the period 1976-2011. The final sample is restricted to customers whose average past purchases
constitute at least 10% of the supplier’s total sales, and the customer is reported by the supplier for
at least three consecutive years. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
The first four columns report results with standard errors clustered at the pair level and the last
four at the customer and supplier level. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are
denoted by “*”, “**” and “***”, respectively.
Credit Return Ind. Adj. Rating Credit Return Ind. Adj. Rating
Rating Volatility Book Lev Downgrade Rating Volatility Book Lev Downgrade
∆ Customer Risk Proxyt−1 -0.005*** 0.006 -0.032** -0.005*** 0.006 -0.032**
(-4.348) (0.250) (-2.371) (-4.356) (0.250) (-2.375)
1 Notch Downgrade -0.010*** -0.010***
(-2.681) (-2.686)
More than 1 Notch Downgrade -0.013*** -0.013***
(-3.056) (-3.062)
∆ Ln(Salet−1) 0.011** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012** 0.011** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012**
(2.033) (2.737) (2.655) (2.057) (2.037) (2.742) (2.660) (2.061)
∆ Market-to-Bookt−1 -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.006***
(-4.157) (-2.607) (-3.555) (-4.104) (-4.165) (-2.611) (-3.561) (-4.112)
∆ ROAt−1 -0.040** -0.033** -0.027** -0.040** -0.040** -0.033** -0.027** -0.040**
(-2.320) (-2.266) (-2.051) (-2.323) (-2.324) (-2.270) (-2.054) (-2.327)
∆ Tangibilityt−1 0.085*** 0.104*** 0.100*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.104*** 0.100*** 0.085***
(3.292) (4.249) (4.371) (3.291) (3.298) (4.257) (4.378) (3.297)
∆ R&D-to-Assett−1 -0.022 -0.020 -0.020 -0.022 -0.022 -0.020 -0.020 -0.022
(-0.603) (-0.599) (-0.672) (-0.628) (-0.604) (-0.600) (-0.673) (-0.629)
Observations 9,453 12,445 13,530 9,453 9,453 12,445 13,530 9,453
R-squared 0.026 0.022 0.023 0.026 0.026 0.022 0.023 0.026
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
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Table 2.5: Net Debt Issuance Regressions
The sample is selected from all manufacturing suppliers with at least one major Compustat customer
over the period 1976-2011. The final sample is restricted to customers whose average past purchases
constitute at least 10% of the supplier’s total sales, and the customer is reported by the supplier for
at least three consecutive years. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
The first three columns report results with standard errors clustered at the pair level and the last
three at the customer and supplier level. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are
denoted by “*”, “**” and “***”, respectively.
Credit Return Ind. Adj. Credit Return Ind. Adj.
Rating Volatility Book Lev Rating Volatility Book Lev
∆ Customer Risk Proxyt−1 -0.007*** -0.043* -0.027* -0.007*** -0.043* -0.027
(-5.196) (-1.771) (-1.825) (-5.571) (-1.798) (-1.620)
∆ Ln(Salet−1) 0.036*** 0.042*** 0.039*** 0.036*** 0.042*** 0.039***
(6.636) (8.365) (8.783) (4.984) (6.471) (6.639)
∆ Market-to-Bookt−1 -0.003** -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.000 -0.001
(-1.990) (-0.228) (-0.424) (-1.444) (-0.162) (-0.312)
∆ ROAt−1 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.004
(0.149) (0.099) (0.354) (0.137) (0.089) (0.321)
∆ Tangibilityt−1 0.111*** 0.126*** 0.121*** 0.111*** 0.126*** 0.121***
(3.479) (4.595) (4.738) (2.870) (3.767) (3.852)
∆ R&D-to-Assett−1 0.057* 0.047 0.052* 0.057 0.047 0.052
(1.698) (1.501) (1.853) (1.492) (1.361) (1.629)
Observations 9,453 12,445 13,530 9,453 12,445 13,530
R-squared 0.038 0.037 0.038 0.038 0.037 0.038
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
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Table 2.6: Beginning-of-the Relationship Debt-Equity Choice
The sample is selected from all manufacturing suppliers with at least one major Compustat customer
over the period 1976-2011. The final sample is restricted to customers whose average past purchases
constitute at least 10% of the supplier’s total sales, and the customer is reported by the supplier for
at least three consecutive years. Net Debt (Equity) Issuance Dummy takes one when the net amount
of debt (equity) issued exceeds 5% of total assets and zero otherwise. Debt vs. Equity Dummy takes
one when the net amount of debt issued exceeds 5% of total assets and zero when the net amount
of equity issued exceeds 5% of total assets. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the pair level. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% levels are denoted by “*”, “**” and “***”, respectively.
Net Debt Issuance Net Equity Issuance Debt vs. Equity
Dummy Dummy Dummy
Credit Return Ind. Adj. Credit Return Ind. Adj. Credit Return Ind. Adj.
Rating Volatility Book Lev Rating Volatility Book Lev Rating Volatility Book Lev
Customer Risk Proxyt−1 -0.002 -0.412*** -0.053 0.006** 0.509*** -0.001 -0.010** -0.812** -0.124
(-0.906) (-3.461) (-1.068) (2.036) (3.195) (-0.020) (-2.067) (-2.559) (-1.312)
∆Ln(Salet−1) 0.072*** 0.083*** 0.077*** 0.171*** 0.157*** 0.151*** -0.129*** -0.090*** -0.101***
(3.373) (4.273) (4.220) (5.808) (6.055) (6.402) (-3.478) (-2.962) (-3.512)
∆Market− to− Bookt−1 -0.007 -0.000 -0.002 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.044*** -0.036*** -0.032*** -0.037***
(-0.934) (-0.012) (-0.319) (3.331) (3.701) (5.137) (-3.108) (-3.095) (-3.910)
∆ROAt−1 -0.083 -0.113* -0.062 -0.090 -0.044 -0.034 0.042 -0.054 -0.024
(-1.221) (-1.880) (-1.099) (-0.975) (-0.541) (-0.435) (0.385) (-0.551) (-0.269)
∆Tangibilityt−1 0.266* 0.386*** 0.418*** 0.301* 0.237 0.297** 0.103 0.284 0.245
(1.689) (2.855) (3.218) (1.648) (1.624) (2.114) (0.409) (1.308) (1.159)
∆R&D − to− Assett−1 0.040 -0.022 0.068 0.398* 0.398** 0.322* -0.152 -0.230 -0.091
(0.253) (-0.146) (0.497) (1.903) (2.036) (1.765) (-0.624) (-1.009) (-0.443)
Observations 2,366 2,949 3,309 2,200 2,766 3,103 749 960 1,081
R-squared 0.050 0.049 0.046 0.063 0.065 0.067 0.161 0.153 0.144
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
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Table 2.7: Customer Risk-Supplier Leverage Relation and Supplier Characteristics
The sample is selected from all manufacturing suppliers with at least one major Compustat customer
over the period 1976-2011. The final sample is restricted to customers whose average past purchases
constitute at least 10% of the supplier’s total sales, and the customer is reported by the supplier for
at least three consecutive years. The coefficient estimate of ∆ Customer Rating is for the base group
which consists of either the youngest suppliers, suppliers in the least concentrated industries or those
with customers operating in the least concentrated industries. The main effects of age, supplier and
customer industry concentration are not reported. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported
in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the pair level. Statistical significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% levels are denoted by “*”, “**” and “***”, respectively.
Supplier Supplier Ind. Customer Ind.
Age Concentration Concentration
∆ Customer Ratingt−1 -0.010*** -0.002 -0.001
(-3.312) (-0.868) (-0.542)
X Medium 0.004 -0.003 -0.006**
(0.999) (-0.878) (-2.113)
X High 0.007** -0.007*** -0.005*
(2.068) (-2.626) (-1.877)
∆ Ln(Salet−1) 0.011* 0.012** 0.011**
(1.896) (2.079) (2.034)
∆ Market-to-Bookt−1 -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(-4.143) (-4.115) (-4.096)
∆ ROAt−1 -0.039** -0.040** -0.040**
(-2.275) (-2.344) (-2.331)
∆ Tangibilityt−1 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.085***
(3.267) (3.281) (3.278)
∆ R&D-to-Assett−1 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022
(-0.610) (-0.629) (-0.626)
Observations 9,453 9,453 9,452
R-squared 0.027 0.027 0.027
Year FE YES YES YES
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Table 2.8: Customer and Supplier Credit Ratings (Annual)
The table reports the regression results for change in supplier credit ratings. The sample is selected
from all manufacturing suppliers with at least one major Compustat customer over the period
1976-2011. The final sample is restricted to customers whose average past purchases constitute at
least 10% of the supplier’s total sales, and the customer is reported by the supplier for at least
three consecutive years. Standard errors are clustered at the pair level. Heteroskedasticity-robust
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are
denoted by “*”, “**” and “***”, respectively.
∆ Supplier Ratingt ∆ Customer Ratingt
∆ Customer Ratingt 0.047
(1.608)
∆ Customer Ratingt−1 0.092*** 0.100***
(3.671) (3.691)
1 Notch Dummyt−1 0.113
(1.432)
More than 1 Notch Dummyt−1 0.273***
(3.710)
∆ Supplier Ratingt−1 -0.012
(-0.574)
∆ Supplier Ratingt 0.035
(1.445)
∆ Customer Ind. Sales Growtht−1 -0.094
(-0.664)
∆ Customer Ind. Market-to-Bookt−1 -0.144
(-1.000)
∆ Customer Ind. ROAt−1 -1.386
(-0.693)
∆ Supplier Ind. Sales Growtht−1 0.430***
(4.113)
∆ Supplier Ind. Market-to-Bookt−1 0.032
(0.429)
∆ Supplier Ind. ROAt−1 -1.237
(-1.109)
Observations 2,280 2,235 2,201 2,235 2,118 2,280
R-squared 0.048 0.053 0.063 0.051 0.075 0.073
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
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Table 2.9: Customer and Supplier Credit Ratings (Monthly)
The table reports the regression results for change in supplier credit ratings. The sample is selected
from all manufacturing suppliers with at least one major Compustat customer over the period
1976-2011. The final sample is restricted to customers whose average past purchases constitute at
least 10% of the supplier’s total sales, and the customer is reported by the supplier for at least
three consecutive years. Standard errors are clustered at the pair level. Heteroskedasticity-robust
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are
denoted by “*”, “**” and “***”, respectively.
∆ Supplier Ratingt ∆ Customer Ratingt
∆ Customer Ratingt 0.017 0.017
(1.214) (1.228)
∆ Customer Ratingt−1 0.022** 0.023**
(2.147) (2.216)
1 Notch Dummy 0.038*
(1.677)
More than 1 Notch Dummy 0.077**
(2.451)
∆ Supplier Ratingt 0.010
(1.185)
∆ Supplier Ratingt−1 0.003
(0.757)
Observations 32,560 32,513 32,491 32,513 32,560 32,317
R-squared 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.077 0.078
Month FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
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Table 2.10: Customer and Supplier Stock Return Volatility (Monthly)
The table reports the regression results for change in supplier stock return volatility within the first
two years of the relationship compared to the year before the relationship starts. The sample
is selected from all manufacturing suppliers with at least one major Compustat customer over
the period 1976-2011. The final sample is restricted to customers whose average past purchases
constitute at least 10% of the supplier’s total sales, and the customer is reported by the supplier for
at least three consecutive years. Standard errors are clustered at the pair level. Heteroskedasticity-
robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels
are denoted by “*”, “**” and “***”, respectively.
Low Customer High Customer
All Small Large Ind. Ind.
Suppliers Suppliers Suppliers Concen. Concen.
After Dummy 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.001 0.003* 0.002*
(2.715) (3.157) (1.219) (1.693) (1.896)
Ex-ante Customer Vol. -0.077** -0.112** -0.108** -0.017 -0.114*
(-2.029) (-2.225) (-2.335) (-0.326) (-1.892)
After Dummy 0.168*** 0.190*** 0.138*** 0.153** 0.184***
X Ex-ante Customer Vol. (3.974) (3.118) (2.866) (2.198) (3.162)
Ex-ante Supplier Vol. 0.770*** 0.620*** 0.774*** 0.771*** 0.770***
(31.196) (16.459) (27.009) (25.664) (18.417)
After Dummy -0.148*** -0.203*** -0.125*** -0.134*** -0.163***
X Ex-ante Supplier Vol. (-6.213) (-5.899) (-3.885) (-3.596) (-5.283)
Observations 55,267 26,550 28,717 26,947 25,872
R-squared 0.385 0.331 0.427 0.396 0.392
Month FE YES YES YES YES YES
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Table 2.11: The Impact of Customer Rating Changes on Survival
The table reports the results from the Cox proportional hazard model of relationship survival. The
sample is selected from all manufacturing suppliers with at least one major Compustat customer
over the period 1976-2011. The final sample is restricted to customers whose average past purchases
constitute at least 10% of the supplier’s total sales, and the customer is reported by the supplier for
at least three consecutive years. Standard errors are clustered at the pair level. Heteroskedasticity-
robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels
are denoted by “*”, “**” and “***”, respectively.
Coefficients
Customer Rating Downgradet−1 0.188** 0.387*** 0.506***
(2.171) (3.139) (3.778)
1 Notch Dummyt−1 0.216**
(2.012)
More than 1 Notch Dummyt−1 0.152
(1.247)
X Medium R&D Supplier Dummy -0.221
(-1.255)
X High R&D Supplier Dummy -0.361**
(-2.051)
X Medium Supplier Dummy -0.412**
(-2.246)
X Large Supplier Dummy -0.521***
(-2.775)
Supplier Sizet−1 -0.213*** -0.214*** -0.213*** -0.200***
(-14.552) (-14.552) (-14.550) (-12.761)
Supplier ROAt−1 0.323*** 0.322*** 0.291** 0.317**
(2.591) (2.584) (2.294) (2.546)
Customer Sizet−1 -0.025 -0.025 -0.024 -0.023
(-1.327) (-1.314) (-1.274) (-1.209)
Customer ROAt−1 0.299 0.288 0.240 0.302
(0.724) (0.696) (0.580) (0.731)
Observations 9,959 9,959 9,959 9,959
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Table 2.12: Net Debt Issuance Activity by Leverage
The table reports the regression results of net debt issuance activity on customer credit rating down-
grade dummy for different supplier leverage quartiles. The sample is selected from all manufacturing
suppliers with at least one major Compustat customer over the period 1976-2011. The final sample
is restricted to customers whose average past purchases constitute at least 10% of the supplier’s
total sales, and the customer is reported by the supplier for at least three consecutive years. The
p-values under the Wald test are reported for the difference of coefficient estimates for each quartile
from the coefficient of quartile 1. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are denoted
by “*”, “**” and “***”, respectively.
(Low Leverage) (High Leverage)
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Customer Rating -0.013*** -0.011* -0.015** -0.024***
Downgrade (-2.738) (-1.707) (-2.190) (-3.520)
P-value 0.7727 0.8153 0.1797
Observations 2,815 2,655 2,795 2,966
R-squared 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.004
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Table 2.13: Net Debt Issuance Regressions with Financial Deficit
The sample is selected from all manufacturing suppliers with at least one major Compustat customer
over the period 1976-2011. The final sample is restricted to customers whose average past purchases
constitute at least 10% of the supplier’s total sales, and the customer is reported by the supplier for
at least three consecutive years. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered at the pair level. The first four columns report results with standard
errors clustered at the pair level and the last four at the customer and supplier level. Statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are denoted by “*”, “**” and “***”, respectively.
Credit Return Ind. Adj. Credit Return Ind. Adj.
Rating Volatility Book Lev Rating Volatility Book Lev
∆ Customer Risk Proxyt−1 -0.007*** -0.040* -0.024* -0.006*** -0.042* -0.025*
(-5.115) (-1.659) (-1.650) (-4.652) (-1.754) (-1.723)
Financing Deficitt 0.061*** 0.073*** 0.061***
(7.584) (9.416) (8.555)
CAPXt/PPENTt−1 0.060*** 0.071*** 0.069***
(11.030) (13.962) (14.721)
∆ Ln(Salet−1) 0.031*** 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.025*** 0.028*** 0.025***
(5.998) (7.407) (7.789) (4.686) (5.594) (5.767)
∆ Market-to-Bookt−1 -0.005*** -0.003** -0.003** -0.004*** -0.001 -0.002
(-3.591) (-2.194) (-2.508) (-2.650) (-0.926) (-1.316)
∆ ROAt−1 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.000 -0.001 0.001
(0.590) (0.584) (0.826) (0.010) (-0.110) (0.116)
∆ Tangibilityt−1 0.094*** 0.107*** 0.104*** 0.119*** 0.130*** 0.128***
(3.046) (3.992) (4.145) (3.851) (4.907) (5.149)
∆ R&D-to-Assett−1 0.036 0.019 0.035 0.075** 0.065** 0.074***
(1.093) (0.629) (1.245) (2.226) (2.108) (2.624)
Observations 9,453 12,445 13,530 9,421 12,398 13,470
R-squared 0.054 0.057 0.054 0.058 0.063 0.064
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
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Table 2.14: Customer Risk and Supplier Investment
The sample is selected from all manufacturing suppliers with at least one major Compustat customer
over the period 1976-2011. The final sample is restricted to customers whose average past purchases
constitute at least 10% of the supplier’s total sales, and the customer is reported by the supplier
for at least three consecutive years. Standard errors clustered at the pair level. Heteroskedasticity-
robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels
are denoted by “*”, “**” and “***”, respectively.
Levels First Differences
Credit Return Ind. Adj. Credit Return Ind. Adj.
Rating Volatility Book Lev Rating Volatility Book Lev
Customer Risk Proxyt−1 0.001 0.025 0.010 -0.004 0.121 0.043
(0.299) (0.242) (0.345) (-1.105) (1.148) (1.121)
CFt−1/PPEt−1 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.015***
(5.432) (5.488) (6.020) (4.439) (4.746) (5.585)
Market-to-Bookt−1 0.087*** 0.092*** 0.089*** 0.065*** 0.064*** 0.065***
(15.991) (17.747) (18.619) (10.892) (11.914) (13.270)
Observations 10,486 13,411 14,571 9,392 12,155 13,213
R-squared 0.121 0.117 0.118 0.059 0.052 0.057
Pair FE YES YES YES NO NO NO
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
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Table 2.15: Additional Robustness Tests
The sample is selected from all manufacturing suppliers with at least one major Compustat customer
over the period 1976-2011. The final sample is restricted to customers whose average past purchases
constitute at least 10% of the supplier’s total sales, and the customer is reported by the supplier for
at least three consecutive years. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered at the pair level. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels
are denoted by “*”, “**” and “***”, respectively.
∆ Total Debtt/
∆ Book Leveraget Total Debtt−1
∆ Customer Ratingt−1 -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.051***
(-4.134) (-2.981) (-4.768)
∆ Customer Ind. Adj. Lev.t−1 -0.036** -0.035** -0.233*
(-2.397) (-2.097) (-1.947)
∆ Ln(Salet−1) 0.012** 0.012*** 0.012* 0.010** 0.267*** 0.264***
(2.107) -2.679 (1.960) (2.107) (6.381) (7.694)
∆ Market-to-Bookt−1 -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.005 0.002
(-4.267) (-3.780) (-3.694) (-2.898) (-0.292) (0.182)
∆ ROAt−1 -0.040** -0.028** -0.038** -0.025* -0.158 -0.097
(-2.334) (-2.062) (-2.137) (-1.787) (-1.518) (-1.156)
∆ Tangibilityt−1 0.084*** 0.096*** 0.087*** 0.098*** 0.958*** 0.944***
(3.227) (4.198) (3.135) (4.150) (3.918) (5.217)
∆ R&D-to-Assett−1 -0.021 -0.021 -0.012 -0.021 0.147 0.248
(-0.598) (-0.702) (-0.353) (-0.696) (0.447) (0.911)
∆ Customer Ln(Salet−1) 0.008 0.006
(0.877) (1.067)
∆ Customer ROAt−1 -0.012 -0.008
(-0.339) (-0.270)
∆ Customer Median Leveraget−1 0.057 0.014
(1.089) (0.312)
Observations 9,346 13,407 9,451 13,530 8,237 11,833
R-squared 0.026 0.023 0.118 0.109 0.028 0.028
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Customer Ind-Year FE YES YES
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Table 2.16: Customer Financial Risk Before and After Supplier IPO (Univariate)
The sample consists of suppliers who report at least one new customer over the four years following
their IPO. For comparison, suppliers are required to have at least one customer over the four years
before their IPO. There is no restriction on the customers reported before the IPO, but the customers
after the IPO are required to be reported for the first time. Customers that exist or newly added in
the IPO year are excluded. If there is more than one year that the same customer appears before
or after the IPO, I include only the first year. All customer variables are measured at the end of
the year prior to the relationship. After IPO takes one if the customer is added within the four
years following the supplier IPO and zero if the customer is reported before the IPO. t-statistics are
reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are denoted by “*”,
“**” and “***”, respectively.
(Book) Ind-Adj. Credit Median St. Dev. Of Investment
Leverage (Book) Lev. Rating Ind. Lev. Monthly Returns Grade
After IPO 0.032** 0.022 1.195*** 0.010 0.017*** -0.065*
(2.099) (1.613) (2.938) (1.072) (2.894) (-1.684)
Observations 552 552 368 558 437 368
R-squared 0.008 0.005 0.023 0.002 0.019 0.008
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Table 2.17: Customer Financial Risk Before and After Supplier IPO (Multivariate)
The sample consists of suppliers who report at least one new customer over the four years following
their IPO. For comparison, suppliers are required to have at least one customer over the four years
before their IPO. There is no restriction on the customers reported before the IPO, but the customers
after the IPO are required to be reported for the first time. Customers that exist or newly added in
the IPO year are excluded. If there is more than one year that the same customer appears before or
after the IPO, I include only the first year. All customer variables are measured at the end of the year
prior to the relationship. After IPO takes one if the customer is added within the four years following
the supplier IPO and zero if the customer is reported before the IPO. Standard errors are clustered
at the supplier level. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are denoted by “*”, “**” and “***”, respectively.
Credit St. Dev. Of Book Credit St. Dev. Of Book
Rating Stock Returns Leverage Rating Stock Returns Leverage
After Supplier IPO Dummy 0.847** 0.012* 0.026* 1.046** 0.014** 0.027*
(2.249) (1.803) (1.815) (2.590) (2.210) (1.908)
Customer Median Ind. Sales Growtht−4 2.160** 0.046** -0.023
(2.213) (2.292) (-0.677)
Customer Median Ind. Sales Growtht−3 2.731** -0.003 -0.106**
(2.052) (-0.166) (-2.467)
Customer Median Ind. Sales Growtht−2 -0.575 0.028 0.013
(-0.451) (1.613) (0.245)
Customer Median Ind. Sales Growtht−1 2.000** -0.019 0.047
(2.240) (-0.920) (0.946)
Customer Median Ind. Stock Returnt−4 -1.446 -0.044*** -0.009
(-1.300) (-3.140) (-0.251)
Customer Median Ind. Stock Returnt−3 -0.640 -0.051*** 0.042
(-0.595) (-3.078) (1.139)
Customer Median Ind. Stock Returnt−2 -0.800 -0.030 0.059*
(-0.686) (-1.498) (1.679)
Customer Median Ind. Stock Returnt−1 -1.681* -0.061*** 0.046
(-1.665) (-3.258) (1.205)
Observations 348 385 464 357 405 500
R-squared 0.125 0.085 0.036 0.036 0.100 0.017
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Table 2.18: Supplier Performance Around Customer Financial Distress
Industry adjustments are carried out by subtracting industry mean from the firm’s performance.
Ex-ante supplier and customer leverage ratios are measured two years prior to the base year. Stock
returns, operating income growth and sales growth are measured over a two-year period centered
around the base year. Customer firms are selected into economically distressed category if their
median industry sales growth is negative and median stock return is less than 30%. Suppliers
are divided into two according to the percentage sales to their major customer as High Sales and
Low Sales. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are
clustered at the pair level. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are denoted by “*”,
“**” and “***”, respectively.
Ind-Adj. Sales Growth Ind-Adj. Stock Return Ind-Adj. Earnings Growth
High Sales Low Sales High Sales Low Sales High Sales Low Sales
Ln(Sales) 0.009* 0.001 0.009 0.020*** -0.006 0.011
(1.729) (0.147) (1.216) (3.225) (-0.453) (0.978)
Ind.-adj. profitability before base year -0.107 -0.013 0.297*** 0.256*** 0.512*** 0.759***
(-1.531) (-0.211) (4.092) (3.529) (4.213) (6.048)
Ind.-adj investment before base year 0.375** 0.611*** -0.272 -0.379 1.091*** -0.086
(2.197) (3.507) (-1.249) (-1.440) (2.779) (-0.171)
Ind.-adj asset sales 0.068* 0.082** 0.062 0.091* 0.247** 0.514***
(1.707) (2.400) (1.153) (1.754) (2.384) (5.266)
Distressed customer industry dummy 0.041 -0.068 -0.019 -0.177** -0.519*** -0.175
(0.525) (-1.030) (-0.258) (-2.264) (-2.669) (-0.853)
Customer leverage -0.016 -0.028 0.099 0.186** 0.112 0.192
(-0.261) (-0.513) (1.308) (2.165) (0.727) (1.291)
Distressed customer industry dummy -0.437** -0.139 -0.472* 0.058 -0.126 0.085
X Customer leverage (-2.132) (-0.858) (-1.678) (0.204) (-0.207) (0.139)
Observations 4,999 5,269 4,469 4,792 5,098 5,301
R-squared 0.021 0.022 0.031 0.026 0.014 0.023
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
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Appendix A: Supplementary Tables
Table A1: Variable Definitions
This table details the variable construction for analysis of the sample. The variable Xpressfeed
pneumonics are given in italic.
Variable Compustat Item Name
Total Debt Short-Term Debt + Long-Term Debt = dltt + dlc
Book Leverage Total Debt / Total Book Assets = dltt + dlc / at
Profitability EBITDA / Assets = oibdp / at
Market Value of Assets = at + prccf * csho - ceq - txdb
Equity = at-(lt+pstkl-txditc-dcvt)
Net Debt Issuance = [dltt(t) + dlc(t) - (dltt(t-1) + dlc(t-1))] / at(t-1)
Net Equity Issuance = [Equity-Equity(t-1) - (re-re(t-1))] / at(t-1)
Sales = Ln(sale)
Tangibility Net PPE / Assets = ppent / at
Market-to-Book Ratio MVA / Total Book Assets
R&D = xrd / at
Size Ln(Total Book Assets)
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Table A2: Industry Distribution of Supplier Firms (1976-2011)
The sample is selected from all manufacturing suppliers with at least one major Compustat customer
over the period 1976-2011. The final sample is restricted to customers whose average past purchases
constitute at least 10% of the supplier’s total sales, and the customer is reported by the supplier
for at least three consecutive years. The last two columns report the number and percentage of
observations in the corresponding industries in Compustat universe. Industries are defined at the
2-digit SIC code level.
Two-digit Supplier Firms Compustat Firms
SIC code Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
20 Food and kindred products 510 3.43 7,316 5.68
21 Tobacco products 0 0 359 0.28
22 Textile mill products 301 2.02 2,161 1.68
23 Apparel & other finished products 809 5.44 2,910 2.26
24 Lumber and wood products ex. furn. 68 0.46 2,122 1.65
25 Furniture and fixture 253 1.7 1,801 1.4
26 Paper and allied products 135 0.91 3,343 2.6
27 Printing publishing and allied 153 1.03 4,145 3.22
28 Chemicals and allied 2,341 15.73 21,207 16.46
29 Petroleum refining and related inds. 32 0.22 2,134 1.66
30 Rubber & misc. plastic products 455 3.06 3,703 2.87
31 Leather and leather products 110 0.74 842 0.65
32 Stone clay glass concrete products 172 1.16 2,197 1.71
33 Primary metal industries 394 2.65 4,708 3.66
34 Fabr. metal ex. machy., trans. eq. 692 4.65 5,235 4.06
35 Inds. comml. machy computer eq. 1,936 13.01 17,124 13.29
36 Electr. oth. elec. eq. ex. cmp. 3,098 20.82 21,185 16.45
37 Transportation equipment 1,622 10.9 6,421 4.99
38 Measr. instr. photo gds. watches 1,364 9.17 16,707 12.97
39 Misc. manufacturing industries 433 2.91 3,186 2.47
Total 14,878 100 128,806 100
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